Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining pp. 195-216: Dilip Abreu and Rajiv Sethi
The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games pp. 217-226: Michael Baye and Heidrun Hoppe-Wewetzer
Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring pp. 227-250: Elchanan Ben-Porath and Michael Kahneman
How noise matters pp. 251-271: Lawrence Blume
The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly pp. 272-285: Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno and Benyamin Shitovitz
Nash equilibrium when players account for the complexity of their forecasts pp. 286-310: Kfir Eliaz
Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game pp. 311-331: Marina Nunez and Carles Rafels
Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences pp. 332-342: Larry Samuelson and Jeroen Swinkels
Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information pp. 343-378: William Sandholm
The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: implementation in Nash equilibrium pp. 379-389: Tomoichi Shinotsuka and Koji Takamiya
Strategic pattern recognition--experimental evidence pp. 390-411: Doron Sonsino and Julia Sirota
An implementation of the Owen value pp. 412-427: Juan Vidal-Puga and Gustavo Bergantinos

Learning under limited information pp. 1-25: Yan Chen and Yuri Khoroshilov
Information management and valuation: an experimental investigation pp. 26-53: John Dickhaut, Margaret Ledyard, Arijit Mukherji and Haresh Sapra
Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations pp. 54-76: Thomas Kittsteiner
Hyperbolic discounting and secondary markets pp. 77-97: Volker Nocke and Martin Peitz
Moral hazard, renegotiation, and forgetfulness pp. 98-113: Francesco Squintani
Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: chopsticks and tetrahedra pp. 114-133: Balazs Szentes and Robert Rosenthal
'Learning' with no feedback in a competitive guessing game pp. 134-144: Roberto Weber
Ignoring the rationality of others: evidence from experimental normal-form games pp. 145-171: Georg Weizsäcker
A derivation of expected utility maximization in the context of a game pp. 172-182: Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler
Endogenous formation of competing partnerships with moral hazard pp. 183-194: Maria Paz Espinosa and Ines Macho-Stadler

Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions pp. 175-188: Eddie Dekel and Asher Wolinsky
Adaptive play with spatial sampling pp. 189-195: Jacques Durieu and Philippe Solal
Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities pp. 196-213: Chen-Ying Huang and Tomas Sjostrom
The effectiveness of English auctions pp. 214-238: Zvika Neeman
Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game pp. 239-265: Amnon Rapoport, William E. Stein, James Parco and Thomas E. Nicholas
Decentralized decision-making in a large team with local information pp. 266-295: Paat Rusmevichientong and Benjamin Van Roy
Bargaining, binding contracts, and competitive wages pp. 296-311: Andreas Westermark
Unraveling in first-price auction pp. 312-321: Parimal Bag
The museum pass game and its value pp. 322-325: Victor Ginsburgh and Israel Zang

Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules pp. 1-27: Lars Ehlers
Symmetric von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in pure exchange economies pp. 28-43: Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz
Strategic behavior and partial cost sharing pp. 44-56: Sjur Flåm and A. Jourani
Networks of collaboration in oligopoly pp. 57-85: Sanjeev Goyal and Sumit Joshi
Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame pp. 86-106: Stefan Napel
On finite strategy sets for finitely repeated zero-sum games pp. 107-136: Thomas C. O'Connell and Richard E. Stearns
Can you guess the game you are playing? pp. 137-152: Jörg Oechssler and Burkhard Schipper
Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances pp. 153-173: Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick Schmitz

Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates pp. 183-207: Rabah Amir, Igor Evstigneev and John Wooders
Admissibility and common belief pp. 208-234: Geir Asheim and Martin Dufwenberg
Trust in triads: effects of exit, control, and learning pp. 235-252: Vincent Buskens
A computational analysis of core convergence in a multiple equilibria economy pp. 253-266: Alok Kumar and Martin Shubik
Nonminimal product differentiation as a bargaining outcome pp. 267-280: Kali Rath and Gongyun Zhao
Playing safe in coordination games:: the roles of risk dominance, payoff dominance, and history of play pp. 281-299: David Schmidt, Robert Shupp, James Walker and Elinor Ostrom
An application of Ramsey theorem to stopping games pp. 300-306: Eran Shmaya, Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille
Strong comparative statics of equilibria pp. 307-314: Federico Echenique and Tarun Sabarwal
A simple and general solution to King Solomon's problem pp. 315-318: Wojciech Olszewski
Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain pp. 319-326: Asher Wolinsky
The Collected Papers of Robert J. Aumann: Robert J. Aumann, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000. Vol. 1, 720 pp; Vol. 2, 672 pp pp. 327-332: Philip Reny

Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments pp. 1-24: Pradeep Dubey and Ori Haimanko
Strategic learning in games with symmetric information pp. 25-47: Olivier Gossner and Nicolas Vieille
Hiding information in electoral competition pp. 48-74: Paul Heidhues and Johan Lagerlof
The network of weighted majority rules and its geometric realizations pp. 75-90: Drora Karotkin and Mary Schaps
Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model pp. 91-100: Flip Klijn and Jordi Masso
A wide range no-regret theorem pp. 101-115: Ehud Lehrer
Learning by not doing: an experimental investigation of observational learning pp. 116-136: Antonio Merlo and Andrew Schotter
The demand bargaining set: general characterization and application to majority games pp. 137-155: Massimo Morelli and Maria Montero
Cost allocation in spanning network enterprises with stochastic connection costs pp. 156-171: Jeroen Suijs
Risk taking in selection contests pp. 172-179: Hans Hvide and Eirik Kristiansen