Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 85, issue C, 2014

Secure message transmission on directed networks pp. 1-18

Jérôme Renault, Ludovic Renou and Tristan Tomala

On the communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria pp. 19-31

Paul W. Goldberg and Arnoud Pastink

Robustness of intermediate agreements for the discrete Raiffa solution pp. 32-36

Walter Trockel

Cournot games with biconcave demand pp. 37-47

Christian Ewerhart

Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium pp. 48-59

Christian Bach and Elias Tsakas

Ranking asymmetric auctions: Filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch pp. 60-69

Rene Kirkegaard

On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games pp. 70-83

Johannes Hörner, Satoru Takahashi and Nicolas Vieille

On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints pp. 84-108

Maciej Kotowski and Fei Li

Strategy-proof preference aggregation: Possibilities and characterizations pp. 109-126

Walter Bossert and Yves Sprumont

Imperfect memory and choice under risk pp. 127-158

Daniel Gottlieb

Communication in bargaining over decision rights pp. 159-179

Wooyoung Lim

A matter of interpretation: Ambiguous contracts and liquidated damages pp. 180-187

Simon Grant, J. Jude Kline and John Quiggin

Social preferences? Google Answers! pp. 188-209

Tobias Regner

Ascending prices and package bidding: Further experimental analysis pp. 210-231

John Kagel, Yuanchuan Lien and Paul Milgrom

Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis pp. 232-251

Sebastian Braun, Nadja Dwenger, Dorothea Kübler and Alexander Westkamp

Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities pp. 252-271

Laurent Mathevet

Robustness to strategic uncertainty pp. 272-288

Ola Andersson, Cédric Argenton and Jörgen Weibull

Monitored by your friends, not your foes: Strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority pp. 289-305

Silvia Dominguez-Martinez, Randolph Sloof and Ferdinand von Siemens

Volume 84, issue C, 2014

Equilibrium selection in common-value second-price auctions pp. 1-6

Heng Liu

The geometry of voting power: Weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids pp. 7-16

Nicolas Houy and William S. Zwicker

Why votes have value: Instrumental voting with overconfidence and overestimation of others' errors pp. 17-38

Ingolf Dittmann, Dorothea Kübler, Ernst Maug and Lydia Mechtenberg

Out of your mind: Eliciting individual reasoning in one shot games pp. 39-57

Konrad Burchardi and Stefan P. Penczynski

Which hat to wear? Impact of natural identities on coordination and cooperation pp. 58-86

Yan Chen, Sherry Li, Tracy Liu and Margaret Shih

Asymmetric parametric division rules pp. 87-110

John Stovall

Compulsory versus voluntary voting: An experimental study pp. 111-131

Sourav Bhattacharya, John Duffy and Sun-Tak Kim

Stability and trembles in extensive-form games pp. 132-136

Yuval Heller

Minimum cost spanning tree problems with indifferent agents pp. 137-151

Christian Trudeau

Dynamic market for lemons with endogenous quality choice by the seller pp. 152-162

Keiichi Kawai

Pandering and electoral competition pp. 163-179

Gabriele Gratton

Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions pp. 180-195

Yoshio Kamijo, Tsuyoshi Nihonsugi, A. Takeuchi and Yukihiko Funaki

Matching mechanisms and matching quality: Evidence from a top university in China pp. 196-215

Binzhen Wu and Xiaohan Zhong

Volume 83, issue C, 2014

How do judgmental overconfidence and overoptimism shape innovative activity? pp. 1-23

Holger Herz, Daniel Schunk and Christian Zehnder

Markets for information: Of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies pp. 24-44

Antonio Cabrales and Piero Gottardi

Strategic complexity in repeated extensive games pp. 45-52

Nozomu Muto

Price competition, free entry, and welfare in congested markets pp. 53-72

Emerson Melo

The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally pp. 73-85

Takehito Masuda, Yoshitaka Okano and Tatsuyoshi Saijo

Political motivations and electoral competition: Equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence pp. 86-115

Michalis Drouvelis, Alejandro Saporiti and Nicolaas Vriend

Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: A revenue dominance theorem pp. 116-126

Jörg Franke, Christian Kanzow, Wolfgang Leininger and Alexandra Schwartz

Entry and espionage with noisy signals pp. 127-146

Alex Barrachina, Yair Tauman and Amparo Urbano

Cheap talk with multiple audiences: An experimental analysis pp. 147-164

Marco Battaglini and Uliana Makarov

Belief consistency and trade consistency pp. 165-177

Ehud Lehrer and Dov Samet

Market share dynamics in a duopoly model with word-of-mouth communication pp. 178-206

Eugen Kovac and Robert Schmidt

Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets pp. 207-223

Eduardo Azevedo

First-best collusion without communication pp. 224-230

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Belief in the opponentsʼ future rationality pp. 231-254

Andrés Perea

Universal type structures with unawareness pp. 255-266

Sander Heinsalu

Analogies and theories: The role of simplicity and the emergence of norms pp. 267-283

Gabrielle Gayer and Itzhak Gilboa

Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty pp. 284-290

Navin Kartik, Olivier Tercieux and Richard Holden

Volume 82, issue C, 2013

Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand pp. 1-14

Fuhito Kojima

Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary pp. 15-30

Pinghan Liang

On games of strategic experimentation pp. 31-51

Dinah Rosenberg, Antoine Salomon and Nicolas Vieille

Evaluating case-based decision theory: Predicting empirical patterns of human classification learning pp. 52-65

Andreas Pape and Kenneth J. Kurtz

Dynamics in near-potential games pp. 66-90

Ozan Candogan, Asuman Ozdaglar and Pablo A. Parrilo

Punishment strategies in repeated games: Evidence from experimental markets pp. 91-102

Julian Wright

Dress to impress: Brands as status symbols pp. 103-131

Rogério Mazali and José Rodrigues-Neto

Spectrum value for coalitional games pp. 132-142

Mikel Álvarez-Mozos, Ziv Hellman and Eyal Winter

Disclosure of information in matching markets with non-transferable utility pp. 143-156

Ennio Bilancini and Leonardo Boncinelli

A characterization of a family of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims pp. 157-168

William Thomson

Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin? pp. 169-191

Matteo Triossi

The Dynamic Vickrey Auction pp. 192-204

Konrad Mierendorff

Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions pp. 205-217

Michal Bresky

Group strategyproof cost sharing: The role of indifferences pp. 218-239

Ruben Juarez

The effect of environmental uncertainty on the tragedy of the commons pp. 240-253

Sam Aflaki

Choosing a licensee from heterogeneous rivals pp. 254-268

Anthony Creane, Chiu Yu Ko and Hideo Konishi

Theoretical and experimental analysis of auctions with negative externalities pp. 269-291

Youxin Hu, John Kagel, Xiaoshu Xu and Lixin Ye

Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility pp. 292-311

Felix Bierbrauer, Craig Brett and John Weymark

Bidding in private-value auctions with uncertain values pp. 312-326

Peter McGee

Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations pp. 327-349

Laurent Mathevet and Ina Taneva

Bilateral k+1-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values pp. 350-368

Cédric Wasser

A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good pp. 369-387

Efthymios Athanasiou

Licensing process innovations when losersʼ messages determine royalty rates pp. 388-402

Cuihong Fan, Byoung Jun and Elmar Wolfstetter

Understanding the reference effect pp. 403-423

Yusufcan Masatlioglu and Neslihan Uler

Mechanism design with a restricted action space pp. 424-443

Liad Blumrosen and Michal Feldman

Strategic information exchange pp. 444-467

Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille

Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems pp. 468-489

Ohad Kadan and Jeroen M. Swinkels

Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces pp. 490-502

Elnaz Bajoori, János Flesch and Dries Vermeulen

Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard pp. 503-521

Sarah Auster

Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition pp. 522-543

Romans Pancs

Similar bidders in takeover contests pp. 544-561

Yun Dai, Sebastian Gryglewicz, Han T.J. Smit and Wouter De Maeseneire

Pareto optimality in coalition formation pp. 562-581

Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt and Paul Harrenstein

Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources pp. 582-591

Daniele Condorelli

On the acceptance of apologies pp. 592-608

Urs Fischbacher and Verena Utikal

The nonatomic supermodular game pp. 609-620

Jian Yang and Xiangtong Qi

Anonymous social influence pp. 621-635

Manuel Förster, Michel Grabisch and Agnieszka Rusinowska

Strategic learning in teams pp. 636-657

Nicolas Klein

Who acts more like a game theorist? Group and individual play in a sequential market game and the effect of the time horizon pp. 658-674

Wieland Müller and Fangfang Tan

Confidence and decision pp. 675-692

Brian Hill

Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare pp. 693-701

Paula Jaramillo, Cagatay Kayi and Flip Klijn

Information-sharing in social networks pp. 702-716

Jon Kleinberg and Katrina Ligett