Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices

Dominik Karos ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 87, issue C, 239-252

Abstract: An apex game consists of one apex player and a set of minor players. We identify two key properties of apex games and use them to introduce the class of general apex games. We derive players' preferences over winning coalitions by applying strongly monotonic power indices on such a game and all its subgames and investigate whether there are core stable coalitions in the induced hedonic coalition formation game. Besides several general results, in particular, we develop conditions on the game for the Shapley–Shubik index, the Banzhaf index, and the normalized Banzhaf index.

Keywords: Apex games; Core stability; Hedonic games; Strong monotony (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:87:y:2014:i:c:p:239-252

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.011

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