Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets

Antonio Romero-Medina and Matteo Triossi
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 87, issue C, 624-630

Abstract: In this study we present a simple mechanism in a many-to-one matching market where multiple costless applications are allowed. The mechanism is based on the principles of eligibility and priority and it implements the set of stable matchings in Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. We extend the analysis to a symmetric mechanism where colleges and students interchange their roles. This mechanism also implements the set of stable matchings.

Keywords: Sequential mechanisms; Stable outcomes; Multiple applications; Irreversibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets (2010)
Working Paper: Non-revelation Mechanisms in Many-to-One Markets (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:87:y:2014:i:c:p:624-630

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.005

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