Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets

Matteo Triossi
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: This paper presents a sequential admission mechanism where students are allowed to send multiple applications to colleges and colleges sequentially decide the applicants to enroll. The irreversibility of agents decisions and the sequential structure of the enrollments make truthful behavior a dominant strategy for colleges. Due to these features, the mechanism implements the set of stable matchings in Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium. We extend the analysis to a mechanism where colleges make proposals to potential students and students decide sequentially. We show that this mechanism implements the stable set as well.

Keywords: Stable; matching; Subgame; perfect; Nash; equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets (2014)
Working Paper: Non-revelation Mechanisms in Many-to-One Markets (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we1018

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