The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions

Christian Seel

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 86, issue C, 330-338

Abstract: This note analyzes a two-player all-pay auction with incomplete information. More precisely, one bidder is uncertain about the size of the initial advantage of his rival modeled as a head start in the auction.

Keywords: All-pay contests; Head start; Asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Value of Information in Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:86:y:2014:i:c:p:330-338

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.04.007

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