 On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithmKeisuke Bando Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 87, issue C, 269-287 Abstract: This study analyzes a preference revelation game in the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm in a college admission problem. We assume that each college's true preferences are known publicly, and analyze the strategic behavior of students. We demonstrate the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium in the preference revelation game through a simple algorithm that finds it. Specifically, (i) the equilibrium outcome from our algorithm is the same matching as in the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm and (ii) in a one-to-one matching market, it coincides with the student-optimal von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM) stable matching. We also show that (i) when a strict core allocation in a housing market derived from a college admission market exists, it can be supported by a strictly strong Nash equilibrium, and (ii) there exists a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the college-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm if and only if the student-optimal stable matching is Pareto-efficient for students. Keywords: Student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm; Strictly strong Nash equilibrium; Efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm; Student-optimal vNM stable matching (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:87:y:2014:i:c:p:269-287 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.009 Access Statistics for this article Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier |
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