A competitive partnership formation process

Tommy Andersson, Jens Gudmundsson, Adolphus Talman and Zaifu Yang

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 86, issue C, 165-177

Abstract: A group of heterogeneous agents may form partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not exist, no agents have incentives to break up any existing partnerships or form new partnerships. This paper proposes a dynamic competitive adjustment process that always either finds an equilibrium or exclusively disproves the existence of any equilibrium in finitely many steps. When an equilibrium exists, partnership and revenue distribution will be automatically and endogenously determined by the process. Moreover, several fundamental properties of the equilibrium solution and the model are derived.

Keywords: Partnership formation; Adjustment process; Equilibrium; Assignment market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 D02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Working Paper: A Competitive Partnership Formation Process (2013)
Working Paper: A Competitive Partnership Formation Process (2013)
Working Paper: A Competitive Partnership Formation Process (2013)
Working Paper: A Competitive Partnership Formation Process (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:86:y:2014:i:c:p:165-177

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.009

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