Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 120, issue C, 2020

A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism pp. 1-15

Simon Loertscher and Leslie M. Marx

Identifiable information structures pp. 16-27

Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko and Rann Smorodinsky

Epistemic game theory without types structures: An application to psychological games pp. 28-57

Pierpaolo Battigalli, Roberto Corrao and Federico Sanna

On the optimal entry fee and reserve price for auctions with selective entry: A comment on Gentry, Li, Lu (2017) pp. 58-66

Nicola Doni and Domenico Menicucci

Bubbles and persuasion with uncertainty over market sentiment pp. 67-85

Sara Negrelli

A sandwich theorem for generic n × n two person games pp. 86-95

Ching-jen Sun

Payoff information and learning in signaling games pp. 96-120

Drew Fudenberg and Kevin He

Innovation adoption and collective experimentation pp. 121-131

Evan Sadler

The evolution of choice and learning in the two-person beauty contest game from kindergarten to adulthood pp. 132-143

Isabelle Brocas and Juan D. Carrillo

Assortative multisided assignment games: The extreme core points pp. 144-153

F. Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz, Carlos Rafels and Neus Ybern

Weak belief and permissibility pp. 154-179

Emiliano Catonini and Nicodemo De Vito

A market design approach to job rotation pp. 180-192

Jingsheng Yu and Jun Zhang

Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments pp. 193-208

Yutaka Kayaba, Hitoshi Matsushima and Tomohisa Toyama

On non-monotonic strategic reasoning pp. 209-224

Emiliano Catonini

Learning by similarity-weighted imitation in winner-takes-all games pp. 225-245

Erik Mohlin, Robert Östling and Joseph Wang

What you don't know can help you in school assignment pp. 246-256

Umut Dur and Thayer Morrill

An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness pp. 257-288

Pierfrancesco Guarino

Dynamic consistency and ambiguity: A reappraisal pp. 289-310

Brian Hill

Bribing the Self pp. 311-324

Uri Gneezy, Silvia Saccardo, Marta Serra-Garcia and Roel van Veldhuizen

Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly pp. 325-335

Rakesh Chaturvedi

On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information pp. 336-344

Max Alston

Limited cognitive ability and selective information processing pp. 345-369

Benson Tsz Kin Leung

Essentially stable matchings pp. 370-390

Peter Troyan, David Delacretaz and Andrew Kloosterman

Non-equilibrium play in centipede games pp. 391-433

Bernardo García-Pola, Nagore Iriberri and Jaromír Kovářík

Self-rejecting mechanisms pp. 434-457

Joao Correia-da-Silva

Volume 119, issue C, 2020

Myopic perception in repeated games pp. 1-14

Miguel Aramendia and Quan Wen

The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching pp. 15-29

Samson Alva and Vikram Manjunath

Games played through agents in the laboratory — a test of Prat & Rustichini's model pp. 30-55

Ludwig Ensthaler, Steffen Huck and Johannes Leutgeb

Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders pp. 56-78

Pak Hung Au and Keiichi Kawai

Agency, potential and contagion pp. 79-97

Jonathan Newton and Damian Sercombe

Positive and negative campaigning in primary and general elections pp. 98-104

Dan Bernhardt and Meenakshi Ghosh

On the roots of the intrinsic value of decision rights: Experimental evidence pp. 110-122

João V. Ferreira, Nobuyuki Hanaki and Benoît Tarroux

The attraction effect and its explanations pp. 123-147

Geoffrey Castillo

Rehabilitation and social behavior: Experiments in prison pp. 148-171

Loukas Balafoutas, Aurora García-Gallego, Nikolaos Georgantzís, Tarek Jaber-Lopez and Evangelos Mitrokostas

Entry-deterring agency pp. 172-188

Simon Loertscher and Andras Niedermayer

Dominance rationality: A unified approach pp. 189-196

John Hillas and Dov Samet

Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity pp. 197-215

Gabriel Ziegler and Peio Zuazo-Garin

Compromise and coordination: An experimental study pp. 216-233

Simin He and Jiabin Wu

Learning and payoff externalities in an investment game pp. 234-250

Chiara Margaria

When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof? pp. 251-266

Jun Zhang

The effect of collusion on efficiency in experimental auctions pp. 267-287

Charles Noussair and Gyula Seres

Perfect and proper equilibria in large games pp. 288-308

Xiang Sun and Yishu Zeng

Rational altruism? On preference estimation and dictator game experiments pp. 309-338

Philip D. Grech and Heinrich H. Nax

Present-bias, procrastination and deadlines in a field experiment pp. 339-357

Alberto Bisin and Kyle Hyndman

Multilateral interactions improve cooperation under random fluctuations pp. 358-382

Jin Li and Michael Powell

Jointly controlled lotteries with biased coins pp. 383-391

Eilon Solan, Omri N. Solan and Ron Solan

Volume 118, issue C, 2019

On the topology of the set of Nash equilibria pp. 1-6

Dieter Balkenborg and Dries Vermeulen

Tick size, price grids and market performance: Stable matches as a model of market dynamics and equilibrium pp. 7-28

Charles Plott, Richard Roll, Han Seo and Hao Zhao

Group targeting under networked synergies pp. 29-46

Mohamed Belhaj and Frédéric Deroïan

Endogenous price leadership with an essential input pp. 47-59

Paul Madden and Mario Pezzino

Competitive equilibrium as a bargaining solution: An axiomatic approach pp. 60-71

Shiri Alon and Ehud Lehrer

Global games with strategic complements and substitutes pp. 72-93

Eric J. Hoffmann and Tarun Sabarwal

On comparison of experts pp. 94-109

Itay Kavaler and Rann Smorodinsky

Rationalizable strategies in random games pp. 110-125

Ting Pei and Satoru Takahashi

Solidarity and efficiency in preference aggregation: A tale of two rules pp. 126-140

Stergios Athanasoglou

Farsighted stability in patent licensing: An abstract game approach pp. 141-160

Toshiyuki Hirai, Naoki Watanabe and Shigeo Muto

Recognition without replacement in legislative bargaining pp. 161-175

Duk Gyoo Kim

The endgame pp. 176-192

Anurag N. Banerjee, Sarit Markovich and Giulio Seccia

Lying and reciprocity pp. 193-218

Simon Dato, Eberhard Feess and Petra Nieken

Diffusion of multiple information: On information resilience and the power of segregation pp. 219-240

Nicole Tabasso

The swing voter's curse in social networks pp. 241-268

Berno Buechel and Lydia Mechtenberg

Let me, or let George? Motives of competing altruists pp. 269-283

Ted Bergstrom, Rodney Garratt and Greg Leo

Should straw polls be banned? pp. 284-294

S. Nageeb Ali and Aislinn Bohren

Information choice in a social learning experiment pp. 295-315

John Duffy, Ed Hopkins, Tatiana Kornienko and Mingye Ma

Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: The impact of higher-order history pp. 316-341

Binglin Gong and Chun-Lei Yang

Balanced implementability of sequencing rules pp. 342-353

Parikshit De and Manipushpak Mitra

Watercooler chat, organizational structure and corporate culture pp. 354-365

Jonathan Newton, Andrew Wait and Simon Angus

Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: Improving student welfare in Chicago pp. 366-373

Battal Dogan and M. Bumin Yenmez

Obvious belief elicitation pp. 374-381

Elias Tsakas

Group contests with private information and the “Weakest Link” pp. 382-411

Stefano Barbieri, Dan Kovenock, David A. Malueg and Iryna Topolyan

Incentive-compatibility, limited liability and costly liquidation in financial contracting pp. 412-433

Zhengqing Gui, Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden and Xiaojian Zhao

An introduction to ABED: Agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics pp. 434-462

Luis Izquierdo, Segismundo Izquierdo and William Sandholm

A model of pre-electoral coalition formation pp. 463-485

Euncheol Shin

A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem pp. 486-490

Youngsub Chun, Manipushpak Mitra and Suresh Mutuswami

Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing pp. 494-510

Saeed Alaei, Jason Hartline, Rad Niazadeh, Emmanouil Pountourakis and Yang Yuan

Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information pp. 511-532

Pablo Azar, Robert Kleinberg and S. Matthew Weinberg

Achieving target equilibria in network routing games without knowing the latency functions pp. 533-569

Umang Bhaskar, Katrina Ligett, Leonard J. Schulman and Chaitanya Swamy

Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in repeated sales pp. 570-588

Nikhil R. Devanur, Yuval Peres and Balasubramanian Sivan

Economic efficiency requires interaction pp. 589-608

Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan and Sigal Oren

On the hardness of designing public signals pp. 609-625

Shaddin Dughmi

A stable marriage requires communication pp. 626-647

Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Noam Nisan, Rafail Ostrovsky and Will Rosenbaum

Welfare maximization with production costs: A primal dual approach pp. 648-667

Zhiyi Huang and Anthony Kim