Vagueness in multidimensional proposals
Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, vol. 121, issue C, 307-328
This paper studies how agents choose to be vague in their proposals in a delegation environment. Two agents compete for the approval of a decision maker to implement a multidimensional action. Based on their knowledge of the consequences of actions, agents propose future actions but can be vague about any dimension. The decision maker, uncertain about the consequences of actions, chooses one agent to act. I show that vagueness on the dimension where one stands closer to the decision maker than his opponent preserves such an advantage, while preciseness undermines it. Vagueness therefore tends to occur on agents' advantageous dimensions.
Keywords: Delegation; Vagueness; Signaling; Intuitive criterion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:121:y:2020:i:c:p:307-328
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