Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
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Auctions with Price-Proportional Benefits to Bidders pp. 339-346: Engelbrecht-Wiggans Richard
Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments pp. 347-369: Robert Forsythe, Horowitz Joel L., Savin N. E. and Martin Sefton
Infinite Histories and Steady Orbits in Repeated Games pp. 370-399: Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler
On Strictly Perfect Sets pp. 400-415: Mathijs Jansen, Jurg A. P. and Peter Borm
Economies with Land--A Game Theoretical Approach pp. 416-430: Legut J., Potters J. A. M. and Tijs S. H.
The Inner Core of an n-Person Game pp. 431-444: Cheng-Zhong Qin
A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects pp. 445-468: Andrew Schotter, Weigelt Keith and Wilson Charles
A Note on Strongly Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria pp. 469-473: Christian Schultz
Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms pp. 474-501: Matthew Jackson, Thomas Palfrey and Srivastava Sanjay
Implementation in Undominated Nash Equilibria without Integer Games pp. 502-511: Tomas Sjostrom
A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation pp. 512-526: Lin Zhou

Intraplay Communication in Repeated Games pp. 181-211: Andreas Blume
Extensive Coverings and Exact Core Bounds pp. 212-219: Bondareva O. N. and Driessen T. S. H.
Strongly Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Infinitely Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring and Discounting pp. 220-237: Cronshaw Mark B. and Luenberger David G.
Posterior Efficiency pp. 238-261: Francoise Forges
Low Discounting and the Upper Long-Run Average Value in Dynamic Programming pp. 262-282: Ehud Lehrer and Monderer Dov
On Nash Equilibrium pp. 283-298: McClendon J. F.
Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability pp. 299-311: Ariel Rubinstein and Asher Wolinsky
Entry Deterrence and Limit Pricing under Asymmetric Information about Common Costs pp. 312-327: Hannu Salonen
Prominence, Symmetry, or Other? pp. 328-332: Martin Shubik

An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games pp. 1-31: Jeffrey Banks, Colin Camerer and David Porter
Game Theory and Literature pp. 32-54: Steven Brams
Continuous Reaction Functions in Duopolies pp. 55-82: James Friedman and Samuelson Larry
An Extension of the Folk Theorem with Continuous Reaction Functions pp. 83-96: James Friedman and Samuelson Larry
Discounting versus Averaging in Dynamic Programming pp. 97-113: Ehud Lehrer and Monderer Dov
A Note on the Implications of Common Knowledge of Rationality pp. 114-129: Barton Lipman
Stochastic Dynamic Market Share Attraction Games pp. 130-149: Monahan George E. and Sobel Matthew J.
The Shapley Value for n-Person Games in Generalized Characteristic Function Form pp. 150-161: Andrzej Nowak and Tadeusz Radzik
Internally Renegotiation-Proof Equilibrium Sets: Limit Behavior with Low Discounting pp. 162-177: Debraj Ray

Adaptive Dynamics, Part II pp. 509-513: Vincent Crawford
Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games pp. 514-531: Joseph Farrell
Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability pp. 532-546: Karl Wärneryd
Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication pp. 547-575: Andreas Blume, Kim Yong-Gwan and Joel Sobel
On the Relationship between Mutation Rates and Growth Rates in a Changing Environment pp. 576-603: Elchanan Ben-Porath, Eddie Dekel and Aldo Rustichini
Evolution of Smartn Players pp. 604-617: Dale Stahl
Competition and Culture in an Evolutionary Process of Equilibrium Selection: A Simple Example pp. 618-631: Fernando Vega-Redondo
Rationalizability, Strong Rationality, and Expectational Stability pp. 632-646: George Evans and Roger Guesnerie
The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation, By Brian Skyrms, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990. 199 pp., $32.50 pp. 647-651: Cristina Bicchieri

Learning Mixed Equilibria pp. 320-367: Drew Fudenberg and David Kreps
Three Problems in Learning Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria pp. 368-386: James Jordan
The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction pp. 387-424: Lawrence Blume
An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction pp. 425-454: Georg Nöldeke and Samuelson Larry
Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games pp. 455-484: Jeroen Swinkels
Asset Markets as an Equilibrium Selection Mechanism: Coordination Failure, Game Form Auctions, and Tacit Communication pp. 485-504: John van Huyck, Raymond Battalio and Richard Beil

Fictitious Play: A Statistical Study of Multiple Economic Experiments pp. 205-222: Boylan Richard T. and Mahmoud El-Gamal
An Example on Quasi-Zero-Monotonic Games pp. 223-226: Chang Chih and Hsiaq Fu-Chao
Optimal Auctions Revisited pp. 227-239: Engelbrecht-Wiggans Richard
Shapley Value for Multichoice Cooperative Games, I pp. 240-256: Chih-Ru Hsiao and Raghavan T. E. S.
On Licensing Policies in Bertrand Competition pp. 257-267: Muto Shigeo
Commitment, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence pp. 268-287: Carolyn Pitchik
Bargaining Solutions without the Expected Utility Hypothesis pp. 288-306: Safra Zvi and Itzhak Zilcha
Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, 2nd, Revised and Enlarged Edition, By Eric van Damme, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1991 pp. 307-310: Inkoo Cho

Game-Theoretic Models of Politics pp. 1-2: Jeffrey Banks and Roger Myerson
Interested Experts and Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals under Open Rule pp. 3-43: Austen-Smith David
A Signaling Theory of Congressional Oversight pp. 44-70: Cameron Charles M. and B. Rosendorff
The Impact of Reelection Pressures on the Fulfillment of Campaign Promises pp. 71-97: Joseph Harrington
Information Revelation in Repeated Delegation pp. 98-117: Patrick Legros
Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis pp. 118-132: Roger Myerson
Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition pp. 133-151: Martin Osborne
The Theory of Voting and Equilibria in Noncooperative Games pp. 152-169: Birgitte Sloth
Weighted Voting, Multicameral Representation, and Power pp. 170-181: Taylor Alan and Zwicker William
The Bipartisan Set of a Tournament Game pp. 182-201: Laffond G., Jean-François Laslier and Le Breton M.