Two examples of strategic equilibrium

Jean-François Mertens

Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, vol. 8, issue 2, 378-388

Abstract: Two examples of strategic equilibrium are given. The first example is a two-person game with a unique dominant strategy for each player where the dominant strategy equilibrium is not extensive form perfect. It is argued that the concept of quasi-perfect equilibria may be superior to that of perfect equilibria. The second example is a two-person game with perfect information, a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, and a unique stable set, but where the latter allows different outcomes. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.

Date: 1995
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Working Paper: Two examples of strategic equilibrium (1995)
Working Paper: Two examples on strategic equilibrium (1992)
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