Two examples on strategic equilibrium

Jean-François Mertens

No 1992008, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: The first example is a two person game with a unique dominant strategy for each player where the dominant strategy equilibrium is not extensive form perfect. It is argued that the concept of quasi-perfect equilibria may be superior to that of perfect equilibria. The second example is a two person game with perfect information and unique subgame perfect equilibrium, and a unique stable set, but where the latter allows different outcomes.

Date: 1992-02-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Two examples of strategic equilibrium (1995)
Working Paper: Two examples of strategic equilibrium (1995)
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