Vertigo: Comparing structural models of imperfect behavior in experimental games

Mahmoud El-Gamal and Thomas Palfrey

Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, vol. 8, issue 2, 322-348

Abstract: We introduce the game of Vertigo to study learning in experimental games with one-sided incomplete information. Our models allow players to make errors when choosing their actions. We compare six models where the players are modeled as sophisticated (taking errors in action into account when constructing strategies) or unsophisticated on one dimension, and employ Bayes' rule, a faster updating rule, or no updating at all on the second. Using a fully Bayesian structural econometric approach, we find that unsophisticated models perform better than sophisticated models, and models with no (or slower) updating perform better than models with faster updating. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 026, 211, 215.

Date: 1995
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825605800041
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Vertigo: Comparing Structural Models of Imperfect Behavior in Experimental Games (1992)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:8:y:1995:i:2:p:322-348

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().