Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality

Robert Aumann

Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, vol. 8, issue 1, 6-19

Abstract: We formulate precisely and prove the proposition that if common knowledge of rationality obtains in a game of perfect information, then the backward induction outcome is reached. Journal of Economic Literatur Classification Numbers: C72 D81.

Date: 1995
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (163)

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