Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
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One-sided patience with one-sided communication does not justify stackelberg equilibrium pp. 299-303: Eddie Dekel and Joseph Farrell
Subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions pp. 304-324: James Friedman and Larry Samuelson
Implementing alternative voting in kingmaker trees pp. 325-336: J. V. Howard
Resale-proofness and coalition-proof Nash equilibria pp. 337-361: Shigeo Muto
Liquid markets and competition pp. 362-377: James Peck and Karl Shell
Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility pp. 378-394: Yves Sprumont

The core of the matching game pp. 203-212: Ahmet Alkan and David Gale
Nash solution and uncertain disagreement points pp. 213-223: Youngsub Chun and William Thomson
The importance of the agenda in bargaining pp. 224-238: Chaim Fershtman
On the existence of equilibrium points in a class of asymmetric market entry games pp. 239-246: Robert Gary-Bobo
Competition on many fronts: A stackelberg signaling equilibrium pp. 247-272: Jerry Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
Informational requirements and strategic complexity in repeated games pp. 273-290: Barton Lipman and Sanjay Srivastava
Bargaining without commitment pp. 291-297: Abhinay Muthoo

Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity pp. 97-117: Jeffrey Banks and Rangarajan K. Sundaram
Pricing and coordination: Strategically stable equilibria pp. 118-128: Jacob Glazer and Andrew Weiss
On the value of information in a strategic conflict pp. 129-153: Morton I. Kamien, Yair Tauman and Shmuel Zamir
Computation as a correlation device pp. 154-172: Barton Lipman and Sanjay Srivastava
Bargaining with durable offers and endogenous timing pp. 173-187: Dale Stahl
Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit pp. 188-201: Eric van Damme, Reinhard Selten and Eyal Winter

The complexity of computing a best response automaton in repeated games with mixed strategies pp. 1-12: Elchanan Ben-Porath
Classical statistics as a theory of incentives pp. 13-28: Edward Green
Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria pp. 29-46: Jonathan Hamilton and Steven M. Slutsky
On totally balanced games arising from cooperation in fair division pp. 47-60: Jerzy Legut
Iterative computation of cournot equilibrium pp. 61-75: Lars Thorlund-Petersen
Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon pp. 76-95: Eythan Weg, Amnon Rapoport and Dan S. Felsenthal

Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games pp. 295-326: B. Douglas Bernheim and Debraj Ray
Renegotiation in repeated games pp. 327-360: Joseph Farrell and Eric Maskin
Efficient renegotiation--proof equilibria in repeated games pp. 361-369: Robert Evans and Eric Maskin
Game theoretic modeling of increasing returns to scale pp. 370-431: William Sharkey

Bounded versus unbounded rationality: The tyranny of the weak pp. 213-221: Itzhak Gilboa and Dov Samet
Efficient allocation of a "prize"-King Solomon's dilemma pp. 222-233: Jacob Glazer and Ching-to Ma
Weighted coalition structure values pp. 234-249: Anat Levy and Richard McLean
Monotonic surplus sharing: Characterization results pp. 250-274: Herve Moulin
Clan games pp. 275-293: Jos Potters, Rene Poos, Stef Tijs and Shigeo Muto

A new axiomatization of the shapley value pp. 119-130: Youngsub Chun
Excess functions and nucleolus allocations of pure exchange economies pp. 131-143: Richard McLean and Andrew Postlewaite
On computable beliefs of rational machines pp. 144-169: Nimrod Megiddo
Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs pp. 170-190: Dov Monderer and Dov Samet
Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences pp. 191-209: Alvin Roth

Games and economic behavior pp. 1-4: Ehud Kalai
Cooperation and bounded recall pp. 5-39: Robert Aumann and Sylvain Sorin
Equilibrium exit in stochastically declining industries pp. 40-59: Charles H. Fine and Lode Li
Psychological games and sequential rationality pp. 60-79: John Geanakoplos, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti
Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations pp. 80-93: Itzhak Gilboa and Eitan Zemel
Information leakage forces cooperation pp. 94-115: Akihiko Matsui
Uniqueness of the Shapley value pp. 116-118: Abraham Neyman