Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 75, issue 2, 2012

Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: An experimental study pp. 449-463

Marina Agranov, Elizabeth Potamites, Andrew Schotter and Chloe Tergiman

Candidate quality in a Downsian model with a continuous policy space pp. 464-480

Enriqueta Aragones and Dimitrios Xefteris

Relative concave utility for risk and ambiguity pp. 481-489

Aurelien Baillon, Bram Driesen and Peter Wakker

Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient? pp. 490-509

Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga and Bernardo Moreno

A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games pp. 510-517

Andreas Blume

Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design pp. 518-537

Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed

Stochastic stability in best shot network games pp. 538-554

Leonardo Boncinelli and Paolo Pin

Strategic reasoning in p-beauty contests pp. 555-569

Yves Breitmoser

Cooperative strategies in anonymous economies: An experiment pp. 570-586

Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari and Maria Bigoni

A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games pp. 587-597

Yi-Chun Chen

Transparency, complementarity and holdout pp. 598-612

Prabal Roy Chowdhury and Kunal Sengupta

What money canʼt buy: Efficient mechanism design with costly signals pp. 613-624

Daniele Condorelli

A dynamic Ellsberg urn experiment pp. 625-638

Adam Dominiak, Peter Duersch and Jean-Philippe Lefort

Testing substitutability pp. 639-645

John William Hatfield, Nicole Immorlica and Scott Kominers

Deliberative democracy and electoral competition pp. 646-667

Patrick Hummel

Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players pp. 668-684

Pedro Jara-Moroni

School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action pp. 685-693

Fuhito Kojima

The efficiency and stability of R&D networks pp. 694-713

Michael König, Stefano Battiston, Mauro Napoletano and Frank Schweitzer

On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations pp. 714-730

Silvana Krasteva and Huseyin Yildirim

Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale pp. 731-751

Bernard Lebrun

Diffusion and cascading behavior in random networks pp. 752-775

Marc Lelarge

Influence networks pp. 776-787

Dunia López-Pintado

Revisiting log-linear learning: Asynchrony, completeness and payoff-based implementation pp. 788-808

Jason R. Marden and Jeff S. Shamma

Comparative statics of altruism and spite pp. 809-831

Igal Milchtaich

A common ground for resource and welfare egalitarianism pp. 832-841

Juan Moreno-Ternero and John Roemer

Coalitional stochastic stability pp. 842-854

Jonathan Newton

Mean and variance responsive learning pp. 855-866

Carlos Oyarzun and Rajiv Sarin

The influence relation for ternary voting games pp. 867-881

Cameron Parker

Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems pp. 882-897

Bary S.R. Pradelski and H. Young

Network structure and strategic investments: An experimental analysis pp. 898-920

Stephanie Rosenkranz and Utz Weitzel

Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in a repeated constant-sum game pp. 921-935

Leonidas Spiliopoulos

Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare pp. 936-947

Peter Troyan

Let them cheat! pp. 948-963

Rodrigo Velez and William Thomson

Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting pp. 964-983

Rui Zhao

On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching pp. 984-989

Scott Kominers

On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts pp. 990-999

Laurent Lamy

Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment pp. 1000-1008

Petra Nieken and Patrick Schmitz

Competitive problem solving and the optimal prize schemes pp. 1009-1013

Toru Suzuki

Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions pp. 1014-1024

Simon Weidenholzer

Volume 75, issue 1, 2012

Markov equilibria in a model of bargaining in networks pp. 1-16

Dilip Abreu and Mihai Manea

Big experimenter is watching you! Anonymity and prosocial behavior in the laboratory pp. 17-34

Franziska Barmettler, Ernst Fehr and Christian Zehnder

Forward-looking behavior in Hawk–Dove games in endogenous networks: Experimental evidence pp. 35-52

Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Karl-Martin Ehrhart and Marion Ott

Potential competition in preemption games pp. 53-66

Catherine Bobtcheff and Thomas Mariotti

Affective decision making: A theory of optimism bias pp. 67-80

Anat Bracha and Donald J. Brown

From perception to action: An economic model of brain processes pp. 81-103

Isabelle Brocas and Juan D. Carrillo

Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment pp. 104-119

Brendan Daley, Michael Schwarz and Konstantin Sonin

Oligopolistic competition in price and quality pp. 120-138

Andrei Dubovik and Maarten Janssen

Asymmetric Cost Sharing mechanisms pp. 139-151

Eric J. Friedman

Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem pp. 152-167

Hans Peter Grüner and Yukio Koriyama

Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models pp. 168-184

Magnus Hoffmann and Grégoire Rota-Graziosi

Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem pp. 185-197

Cheng-Cheng Hu, Min-Hung Tsay and Chun-Hsien Yeh

Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games pp. 198-216

Matthew Jackson, Tomás Rodríguez and Xu Tan

Profit-maximizing matchmaker pp. 217-232

Chiu Yu Ko and Hideo Konishi

Communication and efficiency in auctions pp. 233-249

Nenad Kos

Competitive dynamic pricing with alternating offers: Theory and experiment pp. 250-264

Vincent Mak, Amnon Rapoport and Eyran J. Gisches

Forward induction equilibrium pp. 265-276

Priscilla Man

Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes: A counterexample pp. 277-282

V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha and Yiannis Vailakis

Robertsʼ Theorem with neutrality: A social welfare ordering approach pp. 283-298

Debasis Mishra and Arunava Sen

Evolution of theories of mind pp. 299-318

Erik Mohlin

Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers pp. 319-336

Arjan Non

Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes pp. 337-353

Sunanda Roy and Tarun Sabarwal

Learning in games with risky payoffs pp. 354-371

Aric Shafran

Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games pp. 372-401

Mathias Staudigl

A new stable and more responsive cost sharing solution for minimum cost spanning tree problems pp. 402-412

Christian Trudeau

Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information pp. 413-423

Geoffroy de Clippel, David Perez-Castrillo and David Wettstein

Symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria pp. 424-427

Mark Fey

Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules pp. 428-434

Taro Kumano and Masahiro Watabe

Two-person ex post implementation pp. 435-440

Yoshihiro Ohashi

Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium pp. 441-447

Makoto Shimoji