Minimax play by teams

Yoshitaka Okano

Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 77, issue 1, 168-180

Abstract: We analyze the behavior of two-person teams and individuals who repeatedly play the game with a unique mixed strategy equilibrium in the laboratory. When teams play OʼNeillʼs 4×4 game against another team, the choice frequencies are consistent with equilibrium of the game at the decision-maker level. In contrast, individuals against another individual play far from equilibrium, as previous experiments have found. The hide-and-seek game experiment reveals that teamsʼ behavior is less heterogeneous than individuals. When teams play OʼNeillʼs game against individuals, teams win at above the equilibrium rate in one treatment, but not in the other.

Keywords: Team vs. individual decision making; Minimax; Heterogeneity; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:77:y:2013:i:1:p:168-180

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.003

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