Characterization of the von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter

Daniel Diermeier and Pohan Fong

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 76, issue 1, 349-353

Abstract: We generalize the dynamic bargaining game of Diermeier and Fong (2011) to arbitrary quota rules to provide a non-cooperative characterization of the von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set. Assuming that players are sufficiently patient and have strict preferences, a pure-strategy stationary equilibrium exists and in any such equilibrium, a policy is a steady state if and only if it is in the stable set. The result provides a non-cooperative foundation of stable sets in settings with dynamic policy-making and a persistent agenda setter.

Keywords: von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set; Legislative bargaining; Status quo; Markov perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:76:y:2012:i:1:p:349-353

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.04.002

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