On dynamic compromise

T. Renee Bowen and Zaki Zahran

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 76, issue 2, 391-419

Abstract: Most legislatures require the consent of only a simple majority to pass a proposal, so why donʼt legislative outcomes favor only a bare majority? We show that compromise can be achieved if legislators are neither too impatient nor too patient, and initial allocations are “not too unequal”. The compromise is only sustainable if, starting from the “unequal” allocations there is a possibility of spiraling towards a complete absence of compromise. We find that the range of discount factors for which the equilibrium exists increases as the number of legislators increases. In this sense, compromise is easier in larger legislatures.

Keywords: Compromise; Dynamic legislative bargaining; Markov equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Related works:
Working Paper: On Dynamic Compromise (2009)
Working Paper: On Dynamic Compromise (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:76:y:2012:i:2:p:391-419

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.06.009

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