Why canʼt a woman bid more like a man?

Yan Chen, Peter Katuscak () and Emre Ozdenoren

Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 77, issue 1, 181-213

Abstract: We investigate gender differences and menstrual cycle effects in first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions with independent private values in a laboratory setting. We find that women bid significantly higher and earn significantly less than men do in the first-price auction, while we find no evidence of a gender difference in bidding or earnings in the second-price auction. Focusing on the first-price auction, we find that, while the gender gap in bidding and earnings persists over the entire course of the menstrual cycle, bidding of contraceptive pill users follows a sine-like pattern throughout the menstrual cycle, with higher than average bidding in the follicular phase and lower than average bidding in the luteal phase. In comparison, pill non-users have a flat bidding profile throughout the cycle.

Keywords: Gender; Menstrual cycle; Contraceptive pills; Auction; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D44 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Why Can’t a Woman Bid More Like a Man? (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:77:y:2013:i:1:p:181-213

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.002

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