Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case

Ron Lavi and Sigal Oren

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 76, issue 2, 439-456

Abstract: We analyze a simultaneous ascending auction with anonymous item prices, for two items that are substitutes. This popular format entails increased opportunities for coordination among bidders, since bids are observable and can be used as signaling. This has happened, e.g., in the Netherlands 3G Telecom Auction and in the FCC auctions.

Keywords: Simultaneous ascending auctions; Myopic bidding; Signaling; Ex-post efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:76:y:2012:i:2:p:439-456

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.05.011

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