Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 77, issue 1, 2013

Optimal allocation without transfer payments pp. 1-20

Surajeet Chakravarty and Todd Kaplan

Admissibility and event-rationality pp. 21-40

Paulo Barelli and Spyros Galanis

Gift exchange and the separation of ownership and control pp. 41-60

Sandra Maximiano, Randolph Sloof and Joep Sonnemans

Brothers in arms – An experiment on the alliance puzzle pp. 61-76

Changxia Ke, Kai Konrad and Florian Morath

Coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information pp. 77-89

Masaki Aoyagi

Choice by sequential procedures pp. 90-99

Jose Apesteguia and Miguel Ballester

Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade pp. 100-121

Aviad Heifetz, Martin Meier and Burkhard Schipper

Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations pp. 122-137

Ernesto Reuben and Arno Riedl

To err is human: Implementation in quantal response equilibria pp. 138-152

Norovsambuu Tumennasan

The communication burden of payment determination pp. 153-167

Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen and Michael Schapira

Minimax play by teams pp. 168-180

Yoshitaka Okano

Why canʼt a woman bid more like a man? pp. 181-213

Yan Chen, Peter Katuscak and Emre Ozdenoren

Bribing in first-price auctions pp. 214-228

Shiran Rachmilevitch

The effect of link costs on simple buyer–seller networks pp. 229-246

Gönül Doğan, Marcel van Assen and Jan Potters

Auctions with a profit sharing contract pp. 247-270

Vineet Abhishek, Bruce Hajek and Steven R. Williams

Legitimate punishment, feedback, and the enforcement of cooperation pp. 271-283

Marco Faillo, Daniela Grieco and Luca Zarri

Truth, justice, and cake cutting pp. 284-297

Yiling Chen, John K. Lai, David C. Parkes and Ariel D. Procaccia

Reversibility in dynamic coordination problems pp. 298-320

Eugen Kovac and Jakub Steiner

Profit-seeking punishment corrupts norm obedience pp. 321-344

Erte Xiao

Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining pp. 345-351

Volker Britz

Optimism, delay and (in)efficiency in a stochastic model of bargaining pp. 352-366

Juan Ortner

Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions pp. 367-376

Nejat Anbarci and Ching-jen Sun

Multi-task incentive contract and performance measurement with multidimensional types pp. 377-404

Dawen Meng and Guoqiang Tian

Volume 76, issue 2, 2012

On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel–fringe game pp. 355-374

Hassan Benchekroun and Cees Withagen

Justifiable choice pp. 375-390

Yuval Heller

On dynamic compromise pp. 391-419

T. Renee Bowen and Zaki Zahran

Smooth multibidding mechanisms pp. 420-438

David Perez-Castrillo and Nicolas Querou

Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case pp. 439-456

Ron Lavi and Sigal Oren

Digit ratios, the menstrual cycle and social preferences pp. 457-470

Thomas Buser

Modelling change in individual characteristics: An axiomatic framework pp. 471-494

Franz Dietrich

Bargaining with random implementation: An experimental study pp. 495-514

Nejat Anbarci and Nick Feltovich

Coordination need not be a problem pp. 519-534

Prajit K. Dutta

Endogenous information and stochastic contracts pp. 535-547

Stefan Terstiege

Social norms and trust among strangers pp. 548-555

Huan Xie and Yong-Ju Lee

The probability of nontrivial common knowledge pp. 556-570

Andrea Collevecchio and Marco LiCalzi

A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting pp. 571-581

Bo Chen and Satoru Takahashi

When does aggregation reduce risk aversion? pp. 582-595

Christopher Chambers and Federico Echenique

Alternating-offer games with final-offer arbitration pp. 596-610

Kang Rong

Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study pp. 611-635

Kirill Chernomaz and Dan Levin

Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact pp. 636-647

Hajime Kobayashi and Katsunori Ohta

Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions pp. 648-664

Charles Zheng

Consistency of the Harsanyi NTU configuration value pp. 665-677

M.A. Hinojosa, E. Romero and José Zarzuelo

Deconstruction and reconstruction of an anomaly pp. 678-689

Dirk Engelmann and Martin Strobel

On the effects of joint bidding in independent private value auctions: An experimental study pp. 690-710

Kirill Chernomaz

A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network pp. 711-737

Marie Laclau

Pragmatic languages with universal grammars pp. 738-752

Penelope Hernandez, Amparo Urbano and Jose Vila

Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency pp. 753-772

David Martimort and Lars Stole

Volume 76, issue 1, 2012

Completely uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibria pp. 1-14

Yakov Babichenko

Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement pp. 15-25

Roberto Burguet, Juan-José Ganuza and Esther Hauk

Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games pp. 26-43

Timothy Cason, Roman Sheremeta and Jingjing Zhang

Learning in experimental 2×2 games pp. 44-73

Thorsten Chmura, Sebastian Goerg and Reinhard Selten

Correlated equilibrium and higher order beliefs about play pp. 74-87

Songzi Du

Unbeatable imitation pp. 88-96

Peter Duersch, Jörg Oechssler and Burkhard Schipper

Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games pp. 97-116

John Duffy and Jack Ochs

Social framing effects: Preferences or beliefs? pp. 117-130

Tore Ellingsen, Magnus Johannesson, Johanna Mollerstrom and Sara Munkhammar

Explaining deviations from equilibrium in auctions with avoidable fixed costs pp. 131-159

Wedad J. Elmaghraby and Nathan Larson

New characterizations for largeness of the core pp. 160-180

Arantza Estévez-Fernández

Incorporating unawareness into contract theory pp. 181-194

Emel Filiz-Ozbay

Competition fosters trust pp. 195-209

Steffen Huck, Gabriele K. Lünser and Jean-Robert Tyran

Non-Bayesian social learning pp. 210-225

Ali Jadbabaie, Pooya Molavi, Alvaro Sandroni and Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi

Favoritism in asymmetric contests: Head starts and handicaps pp. 226-248

Rene Kirkegaard

Political competition between differentiated candidates pp. 249-271

Stefan Krasa and Mattias K Polborn

Efficiency and stochastic stability in normal form games pp. 272-284

Priscilla Man

Strategy-proof partitioning pp. 285-300

Debasis Mishra and Souvik Roy

Competing conventions pp. 301-328

Philip R. Neary

Existence, incentive compatibility and efficiency of the rational expectations equilibrium pp. 329-339

Yeneng Sun, Lei Wu and Nicholas C. Yannelis

A correction to “Large games and the law of large numbers” [Games Econom. Behav. 64 (2008) 1–34] pp. 340-343

Juha Tolvanen and Elefterios Soultanis

Efficiency and collusion neutrality in cooperative games and networks pp. 344-348

Rene van den Brink

Characterization of the von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter pp. 349-353

Daniel Diermeier and Pohan Fong