Competition for procurement shares

Jose Alcalde and Matthias Dahm

Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 80, issue C, 193-208

Abstract: We propose a new procurement procedure that allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are the following: (i) Bidders have an incentive to participate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows variations in the extent to which affirmative action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even while accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement expenditures might be lower than under a standard auction format.

Keywords: Procurement auction; Affirmative action (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Competition for procurement shares (2011)
Working Paper: Competition for Procurement Shares (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:80:y:2013:i:c:p:193-208

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.007

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