Competition for procurement shares

Jose Alcalde and Matthias Dahm

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are: (i) Bidders have an incentive to participate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which affirmative action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement expenditures might be lower than under a classical auction format.

Keywords: Procurement Auction; Armative Action (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07-07
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Related works:
Journal Article: Competition for procurement shares (2013)
Working Paper: Competition for Procurement Shares (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:32078

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