The price of imperfect competition for a spanning network

Herve Moulin and Rodrigo Velez

Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 81, issue C, 11-26

Abstract: A buyer procures a network to span a given set of nodes; each seller bids to supply certain edges, then the buyer purchases a minimal cost spanning tree. An efficient tree is constructed in any equilibrium of the Bertrand game.

Keywords: Algorithmic mechanism design; Worst case scenario equilibrium analysis; Frugality; Minimum cost spanning tree problem; Price of imperfect competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C79 D40 D43 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:81:y:2013:i:c:p:11-26

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.012

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