Using or hiding private information? An experimental study of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information

Nicolas Jacquemet () and Frederic Koessler

Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 78, issue C, 103-120

Abstract: This paper studies the value of private information in strictly competitive interactions in which there is a trade-off between (i) the short-run gain of using information, and (ii) the long-run gain of concealing it. We implement simple examples from the class of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information. While the empirical value of information does not always coincide with the theoretical prediction, the qualitative properties of the value of information are satisfied in the laboratory: (i) it is never negative, (ii) it decreases with the number of repetitions, (iii) it is bounded below by the value of the infinitely repeated game, and (iv) it is bounded above by the value of the one-shot game. In line with the theory, the empirical use of private information is almost complete when it should be, and decreases in longer interactions.

Keywords: Concealment of information; Laboratory experiments; Value of information; Zero-sum repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612001832
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (2013)
Working Paper: Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (2013)
Working Paper: Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (2011)
Working Paper: Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (2011)
Working Paper: Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (2011)
Working Paper: Using or Hiding Private Information? An experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:78:y:2013:i:c:p:103-120

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.12.002

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().