Absorbing sets in roommate problems
C. Larrea and
Elena Molis ()
Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 81, issue C, 165-178
We analyze absorbing sets as a solution for roommate problems with strict preferences. This solution provides the set of stable matchings when it is non-empty and some matchings with interesting properties otherwise. In particular, all matchings in an absorbing set have the greatest number of agents with no incentive to change partners. These “satisfied” agents are paired in the same stable manner. In the case of multiple absorbing sets we find that any two such sets differ only in how satisfied agents are matched with each other.
Keywords: Roommate problem; Stability; Absorbing sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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