Eureka Learning: Heuristics and response time in perfect information games

C. Nicholas McKinney and John van Huyck

Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 79, issue C, 223-232

Abstract: This paper investigates the possibility that people discover effective heuristics when playing similar perfect information games of varying complexity. We call this discovery experience Eureka Learning. We use a change-point analysis to identify 35 percent of our subjects as Eureka Learners.

Keywords: Bounded rationality; Experiment; Human behavior; Learning; Nim; Perfect information; Heuristics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:79:y:2013:i:c:p:223-232

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.003

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