A dynamic school choice model

Juan Pereyra ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 80, issue C, 100-114

Abstract: This paper inspires from a real-life assignment problem faced by the Mexican Ministry of Public Education. We introduce a dynamic school choice problem that consists in assigning positions to overlapping generations of teachers. From one period to another, teachers can either retain their current positions or choose a preferred one. In this framework, a solution concept that conciliates the fairness criteria with the individual rationality condition is introduced. It is then proved that a solution always exists and that it can be reached by a modified version of the deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley. We also show that the mechanism is dynamically strategy-proof, and respects improvements whenever the set of orders is lexicographic by tenure.

JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 D78 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

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Working Paper: A dynamic school choice model (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:80:y:2013:i:c:p:100-114

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.011

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