A dynamic school choice model

Juan Pereyra ()

Serie documentos de trabajo del Centro de Estudios Económicos from El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos

Abstract: This paper considers a real-life assignment problem faced by the Mexican Ministry of Public Education. Inspired by this situation, we introduce a dynamic school choice problem that consists in assigning positions to overlapping generations of teachers. From one period to another, agents are allowed either to retain their current position or to choose a preferred one. In this framework, a solution concept that conciliates the fairness criteria with the individual rationality condition is introduced. It is then proved that a fair matching always exists and that it can be reached by a modified version of the deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley. We also show that the mechanism is dynamic strategy-proof, and respects improvements whenever the set of orders is lexicographic by tenure.

Keywords: school choice; overlapping agents; dynamic matching; deferred acceptance algorithm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 D78 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-gth, nep-lab and nep-ure
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https://cee.colmex.mx/dts/2011/DT-2011-5.pdf (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: A dynamic school choice model (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:emx:ceedoc:2011-05

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