Games and Economic Behavior
1989 - 2025
Current editor(s): E. Kalai From Elsevier Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu (). Access Statistics for this journal.
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Volume 149, issue C, 2025
- Regularized Bayesian best response learning in finite games pp. 1-31

- Sayan Mukherjee and Souvik Roy
- Local public good equilibrium pp. 32-42

- Nathan W. Chan and Anne van den Nouweland
- Seemingly baseless discrimination pp. 43-55

- Maciej Dudek
- The economics of excuses: Job market cheap talk with pre-employment tests pp. 56-64

- Ran Weksler and Boaz Zik
- Strategic ambiguity in global games pp. 65-81

- Takashi Ui
- How cognitive skills affect strategic behavior: Cognitive ability, fluid intelligence and judgment pp. 82-95

- David Gill, Zachary Knepper, Victoria Prowse and Junya Zhou
- Understanding dynamic interactions pp. 96-111

- Konrad Grabiszewski and Alex Horenstein
- Axiomatic bargaining theory: New wine from old bottles pp. 112-117

- Dominik Karos and Shiran Rachmilevitch
- Optimal private payoff manipulation against commitment in extensive-form games pp. 118-147

- Yurong Chen, Xiaotie Deng and Yuhao Li
- School choice with farsighted students pp. 148-163

- Ata Atay, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch
- Boundedness of the range of a strategy-proof social choice function pp. 164-169

- Shigehiro Serizawa and John Weymark
- Status quo bias with choice overload pp. 170-186

- Jiaqi Yang
Volume 148, issue C, 2024
- A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games pp. 1-22

- Agustín Bonifacio, E. Inarra and P. Neme
- Reselling information pp. 23-43

- S. Nageeb Ali, Ayal Chen-Zion and Erik Lillethun
- The motive matters: Experimental evidence on the expressive function of punishment pp. 44-67

- Daniele Nosenzo, Erte Xiao and Nina Xue
- Failing to utilize potentially effective focal points: Prominence can stymie coordination on distinct actions pp. 68-81

- Uri Gneezy and Yuval Rottenstreich
- Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off? pp. 82-96

- Estelle Cantillon, Li Chen and Juan Pereyra
- Cheap talk with two-sided private information pp. 97-118

- Inés Moreno de Barreda
- Can threats improve payoffs from bargaining in markets with retaliations? Evidence from a field experiment pp. 119-137

- Haimanti Bhattacharya and Subhasish Dugar
- Norms and the evolution of leaders' followership pp. 138-161

- Antonio Cabrales and Esther Hauk
- Breaking bad: Malfunctioning control institutions erode good behavior in a cheating game pp. 162-178

- Rustamdjan Hakimov and Agne Kajackaite
- Cognitive reflection in experimental anchored guessing games pp. 179-195

- Coralio Ballester, Antonio Rodriguez-Moral and Marc Vorsatz
- Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents pp. 196-217

- Yingjie Niu and Zhentao Zou
- Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests pp. 218-243

- Zhonghong Kuang, Hangcheng Zhao and Jie Zheng
- Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints pp. 244-263

- Gregory Z. Gutin, Philip R. Neary and Anders Yeo
- Equilibria in matching markets with soft and hard liquidity constraints pp. 264-278

- P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Yu Zhou
- Commitment to the truth creates trust in market exchange: Experimental evidence pp. 279-295

- Nicolas Jacquemet, Stéphane Luchini, Jason F. Shogren and Adam Zylbersztejn
- Time for memorable consumption pp. 296-322

- Stefania Minardi and Andrei Savochkin
- Towards data auctions with externalities pp. 323-356

- Anish Agarwal, Munther Dahleh, Thibaut Horel and Maryann Rui
- Stability vs. no justified envy pp. 357-366

- Assaf Romm, Alvin Roth and Ran I. Shorrer
- Ambiguity and informativeness of (non-)trading pp. 367-384

- Yinxiao Chu
- Strategic behavior in one-to-one matching markets without outside options pp. 385-397

- Camilo J. Sirguiado and Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez
- Cooperating with yourself pp. 398-414

- Kirill Borissov, Mikhail Pakhnin and Ron Wendner
- Risk preferences of learning algorithms pp. 415-426

- Andreas Haupt and Aroon Narayanan
- Complete conditional type structures pp. 427-448

- Nicodemo De Vito
- Inference from biased polls pp. 449-486

- Andy Brownback, Nathaniel Burke and Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch
- Strategic responses to personalized pricing and demand for privacy: An experiment pp. 487-516

- Inacio Bo, Li Chen and Rustamdjan Hakimov
- Partial credence goods on review platforms pp. 517-534

- Ronen Gradwohl and Artyom Jelnov
- A recursive measure of voting power that satisfies reasonable postulates pp. 535-565

- Arash Abizadeh and Adrian Vetta
- Tight incentive analysis of Sybil attacks against the market equilibrium of resource exchange over general networks pp. 566-610

- Yukun Cheng, Xiaotie Deng, Yuhao Li and Xiang Yan
Volume 147, issue C, 2024
- Asymmetric auctions: Perturbations, ε- equilibrium, and equilibrium pp. 1-18

- G.V.A. Dharanan and Alex Ellis
- Bicriteria Nash flows over time pp. 19-37

- Tim Oosterwijk, Daniel Schmand and Marc Schröder
- The existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a discrete ponds dilemma pp. 38-51

- Vasily Gusev, Alexander Nesterov, Mikhail Reshetov and Alex Suzdaltsev
- Clubs and networks pp. 52-73

- Sihua Ding, Marcin Dziubiński and Sanjeev Goyal
- Peace in an unequal world? Experimental evidence on the relationship between inequality and conflict in a guns-vs-butter setting pp. 74-87

- Alexandra Baier, Sophia Seelos and Thomas Rittmannsberger
- Random partitions, potential, value, and externalities pp. 88-106

- André Casajus, Yukihiko Funaki and Frank Huettner
- Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences pp. 107-127

- Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, Oihane Gallo and Marc Vorsatz
- Reputation-based persuasion platforms pp. 128-147

- Itai Arieli, Omer Madmon and Moshe Tennenholtz
- Gender and cooperation in the presence of negative externalities pp. 148-169

- Justus Haucap, Christina Heldman and Holger A. Rau
- School choice with independent versus consolidated districts pp. 170-205

- Thilo Klein, Robert Aue and Josué Ortega
- An observability paradox in linked enforcement pp. 206-220

- Quan Wen and Bingyong Zheng
- Group bargaining: A model of international treaty ratification pp. 221-241

- Ravideep Sethi and WonSeok Yoo
- Cooperation, norms, and gene-culture coevolution pp. 242-267

- Fabian Mankat
- Fair division with two-sided preferences pp. 268-287

- Ayumi Igarashi, Yasushi Kawase, Warut Suksompong and Hanna Sumita
- Revealed preference domains from random choice pp. 288-304

- Kremena Valkanova
- Can compulsory voting reduce information acquisition? pp. 305-337

- Linnéa Marie Rohde
- Signaling motives in lying games pp. 338-376

- Tilman Fries
- Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information pp. 377-387

- Itai Arieli and Srinivas Arigapudi
- Changing collective action: Nudges and team decisions pp. 388-406

- Florian Diekert and Tillmann Eymess
- Manipulating the outcome of stable marriage and roommates problems pp. 407-428

- Kristóf Bérczi, Gergely Csáji and Tamás Király
- To Catch a Stag: Identifying payoff- and risk-dominance effects in coordination games pp. 429-448

- Stephan Jagau
- Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: Signaling under behavioral diversity pp. 449-459

- Junichiro Ishida and Wing Suen
- Skewness preferences: Evidence from online poker pp. 460-484

- Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt, Johannes Kasinger and Dmitrij Schneider
- Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems pp. 485-516

- Oihane Gallo and Bettina Klaus
- Measuring socially appropriate social preferences pp. 517-532

- Jeffrey Carpenter and Andrea Robbett
- Stability and substitutability in multi-period matching markets pp. 533-553

- Keisuke Bando and Ryo Kawasaki
- A note on motivated cognition and discriminatory beliefs pp. 554-562

- Lasse S. Stoetzer and Florian Zimmermann
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