Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 147, issue C, 2024

Asymmetric auctions: Perturbations, ε- equilibrium, and equilibrium pp. 1-18

G.V.A. Dharanan and Alex Ellis

Bicriteria Nash flows over time pp. 19-37

Tim Oosterwijk, Daniel Schmand and Marc Schröder

The existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a discrete ponds dilemma pp. 38-51

Vasily Gusev, Alexander Nesterov, Mikhail Reshetov and Alex Suzdaltsev

Clubs and networks pp. 52-73

Sihua Ding, Marcin Dziubiński and Sanjeev Goyal

Peace in an unequal world? Experimental evidence on the relationship between inequality and conflict in a guns-vs-butter setting pp. 74-87

Alexandra Baier, Sophia Seelos and Thomas Rittmannsberger

Random partitions, potential, value, and externalities pp. 88-106

André Casajus, Yukihiko Funaki and Frank Huettner

Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences pp. 107-127

Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, Oihane Gallo and Marc Vorsatz

Reputation-based persuasion platforms pp. 128-147

Itai Arieli, Omer Madmon and Moshe Tennenholtz

Gender and cooperation in the presence of negative externalities pp. 148-169

Justus Haucap, Christina Heldman and Holger A. Rau

School choice with independent versus consolidated districts pp. 170-205

Thilo Klein, Robert Aue and Josué Ortega

An observability paradox in linked enforcement pp. 206-220

Quan Wen and Bingyong Zheng

Group bargaining: A model of international treaty ratification pp. 221-241

Ravideep Sethi and WonSeok Yoo

Cooperation, norms, and gene-culture coevolution pp. 242-267

Fabian Mankat

Fair division with two-sided preferences pp. 268-287

Ayumi Igarashi, Yasushi Kawase, Warut Suksompong and Hanna Sumita

Revealed preference domains from random choice pp. 288-304

Kremena Valkanova

Can compulsory voting reduce information acquisition? pp. 305-337

Linnéa Marie Rohde

Signaling motives in lying games pp. 338-376

Tilman Fries

Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information pp. 377-387

Itai Arieli and Srinivas Arigapudi

Changing collective action: Nudges and team decisions pp. 388-406

Florian Diekert and Tillmann Eymess

Manipulating the outcome of stable marriage and roommates problems pp. 407-428

Kristóf Bérczi, Gergely Csáji and Tamás Király

To Catch a Stag: Identifying payoff- and risk-dominance effects in coordination games pp. 429-448

Stephan Jagau

Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: Signaling under behavioral diversity pp. 449-459

Junichiro Ishida and Wing Suen

Skewness preferences: Evidence from online poker pp. 460-484

Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt, Johannes Kasinger and Dmitrij Schneider

Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems pp. 485-516

Oihane Gallo and Bettina Klaus

Measuring socially appropriate social preferences pp. 517-532

Jeffrey Carpenter and Andrea Robbett

Stability and substitutability in multi-period matching markets pp. 533-553

Keisuke Bando and Ryo Kawasaki

A note on motivated cognition and discriminatory beliefs pp. 554-562

Lasse S. Stoetzer and Florian Zimmermann

Volume 146, issue C, 2024

Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting pp. 1-34

François Durand, Antonin Macé and Matías Núñez

The Texas Shoot-Out under Knightian uncertainty pp. 35-50

Gerrit Bauch and Frank Riedel

Not all is lost: Sorting and self-stabilizing sets pp. 51-58

Esteban Peralta

Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses pp. 59-76

Duk Gyoo Kim and Wooyoung Lim

Aggregating inconclusive data sets pp. 77-90

Gabrielle Gayer, Ehud Lehrer and Dotan Persitz

On the manipulability of allocation rules through endowment augmentation pp. 91-104

William Thomson

Integrating Raiffa and Nash approaches to bargaining using interim agreements pp. 105-120

Kalyan Chatterjee and Rakesh Chaturvedi

Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market pp. 121-136

Helmut Bester

Folk theorems in repeated games with switching costs pp. 137-159

Yevgeny Tsodikovich, Xavier Venel and Anna Zseleva

Belief formation under signal correlation pp. 160-183

Tanjim Hossain and Ryo Okui

Efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies pp. 184-195

Nabil Afodjo and Roland Pongou

Differentiating roles of the reference alternative pp. 196-221

Dan Qin

Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types pp. 222-233

Ori Haimanko

Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets pp. 234-254

Di Feng, Bettina Klaus and Flip Klijn

How alliances form and conflict ensues pp. 255-276

Lu Dong, Lingbo Huang, Jaimie W. Lien and Jie Zheng

Capacity design in school choice pp. 277-291

Mustafa Oğuz Afacan, Umut Dur and Martin Van der Linden

Social learning with partial and aggregate information: Experimental evidence pp. 292-307

Elisa Cavatorta, Antonio Guarino and Steffen Huck

Posted offers with charitable promises: True preferences and strategic behavior pp. 308-326

Claudia Schwirplies and Andreas Lange

Volume 145, issue C, 2024

Two experiments on trading information goods in a network pp. 1-18

Nobuyuki Hanaki, Yutaka Kayaba, Jun Maekawa and Hitoshi Matsushima

An undecidable statement regarding zero-sum games pp. 19-26

Mark Fey

Simple relational contracts and the dynamics of social capital pp. 27-53

Mathieu V. Leduc

Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition pp. 54-65

Yanlin Chen, Audrey Hu and Jun Zhang

Efficiency wages with motivated agents pp. 66-83

Jesper Armouti-Hansen, Lea Cassar, Anna Deréky and Florian Engl

Equilibrium information in credence goods pp. 84-101

Ting Liu and Ching-to Ma

Bayesian stable states pp. 102-116

Yi-Chun Chen and Gaoji Hu

Hidden in plain sight: Payoffs, probability, space, and time in isomorphic tasks pp. 117-136

Sean M. Collins and Duncan James

On common evaluation standards and the acceptance of wage inequality pp. 137-156

Peter Werner

Entry under placement uncertainty pp. 157-196

Sunanda Roy, Rajesh Singh and Quinn Weninger

Efficient matching under general constraints pp. 197-207

Kenzo Imamura and Yasushi Kawase

Voting to persuade pp. 208-216

Tsz-Ning Wong, Lily Ling Yang and Xin Zhao

Strong core and Pareto-optimality in the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preference domains pp. 217-238

Péter Biró and Gergely Csáji

Best-response dynamics in two-person random games with correlated payoffs pp. 239-262

Hlafo Alfie Mimun, Matteo Quattropani and Marco Scarsini

Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction pp. 263-284

Huiyi Guo

Relative performance evaluation in spillover networks pp. 285-311

Yang Sun and Wei Zhao

Experimental evidence on the relationship between perceived ambiguity and likelihood insensitivity pp. 312-338

Luca Henkel

Information avoidance in school choice pp. 339-355

Paola Moscariello

Information flows and memory in games pp. 356-376

Pierpaolo Battigalli and Nicolò Generoso

Myopic oligopoly pricing pp. 377-412

Iwan Bos, Marco Marini and Riccardo D. Saulle

Auction design with heterogeneous priors pp. 413-425

Hien Pham and Takuro Yamashita

Maximal Condorcet domains. A further progress report pp. 426-450

Clemens Puppe and Arkadii Slinko

Who's the deceiver? Identifying deceptive intentions in communication pp. 451-466

Juan Francisco Blazquiz-Pulido, Luca Polonio and Ennio Bilancini

Contests within and between groups: Theory and experiment pp. 467-492

Puja Bhattacharya and Jeevant Rampal

Identity change and economic mobility: Experimental evidence pp. 493-509

Manuel Muñoz

Oddness of the number of Nash equilibria: The case of polynomial payoff functions pp. 510-525

Philippe Bich and Julien Fixary

Winner's effort in multi-battle team contests pp. 526-556

Stefano Barbieri and Marco Serena