Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Volume 149, issue C, 2025

Regularized Bayesian best response learning in finite games pp. 1-31

Sayan Mukherjee and Souvik Roy

Local public good equilibrium pp. 32-42

Nathan W. Chan and Anne van den Nouweland

Seemingly baseless discrimination pp. 43-55

Maciej Dudek

The economics of excuses: Job market cheap talk with pre-employment tests pp. 56-64

Ran Weksler and Boaz Zik

Strategic ambiguity in global games pp. 65-81

Takashi Ui

How cognitive skills affect strategic behavior: Cognitive ability, fluid intelligence and judgment pp. 82-95

David Gill, Zachary Knepper, Victoria Prowse and Junya Zhou

Understanding dynamic interactions pp. 96-111

Konrad Grabiszewski and Alex Horenstein

Axiomatic bargaining theory: New wine from old bottles pp. 112-117

Dominik Karos and Shiran Rachmilevitch

Optimal private payoff manipulation against commitment in extensive-form games pp. 118-147

Yurong Chen, Xiaotie Deng and Yuhao Li

School choice with farsighted students pp. 148-163

Ata Atay, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

Boundedness of the range of a strategy-proof social choice function pp. 164-169

Shigehiro Serizawa and John Weymark

Status quo bias with choice overload pp. 170-186

Jiaqi Yang

Volume 148, issue C, 2024

A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games pp. 1-22

Agustín Bonifacio, E. Inarra and P. Neme

Reselling information pp. 23-43

S. Nageeb Ali, Ayal Chen-Zion and Erik Lillethun

The motive matters: Experimental evidence on the expressive function of punishment pp. 44-67

Daniele Nosenzo, Erte Xiao and Nina Xue

Failing to utilize potentially effective focal points: Prominence can stymie coordination on distinct actions pp. 68-81

Uri Gneezy and Yuval Rottenstreich

Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off? pp. 82-96

Estelle Cantillon, Li Chen and Juan Pereyra

Cheap talk with two-sided private information pp. 97-118

Inés Moreno de Barreda

Can threats improve payoffs from bargaining in markets with retaliations? Evidence from a field experiment pp. 119-137

Haimanti Bhattacharya and Subhasish Dugar

Norms and the evolution of leaders' followership pp. 138-161

Antonio Cabrales and Esther Hauk

Breaking bad: Malfunctioning control institutions erode good behavior in a cheating game pp. 162-178

Rustamdjan Hakimov and Agne Kajackaite

Cognitive reflection in experimental anchored guessing games pp. 179-195

Coralio Ballester, Antonio Rodriguez-Moral and Marc Vorsatz

Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents pp. 196-217

Yingjie Niu and Zhentao Zou

Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests pp. 218-243

Zhonghong Kuang, Hangcheng Zhao and Jie Zheng

Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints pp. 244-263

Gregory Z. Gutin, Philip R. Neary and Anders Yeo

Equilibria in matching markets with soft and hard liquidity constraints pp. 264-278

P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Yu Zhou

Commitment to the truth creates trust in market exchange: Experimental evidence pp. 279-295

Nicolas Jacquemet, Stéphane Luchini, Jason F. Shogren and Adam Zylbersztejn

Time for memorable consumption pp. 296-322

Stefania Minardi and Andrei Savochkin

Towards data auctions with externalities pp. 323-356

Anish Agarwal, Munther Dahleh, Thibaut Horel and Maryann Rui

Stability vs. no justified envy pp. 357-366

Assaf Romm, Alvin Roth and Ran I. Shorrer

Ambiguity and informativeness of (non-)trading pp. 367-384

Yinxiao Chu

Strategic behavior in one-to-one matching markets without outside options pp. 385-397

Camilo J. Sirguiado and Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez

Cooperating with yourself pp. 398-414

Kirill Borissov, Mikhail Pakhnin and Ron Wendner

Risk preferences of learning algorithms pp. 415-426

Andreas Haupt and Aroon Narayanan

Complete conditional type structures pp. 427-448

Nicodemo De Vito

Inference from biased polls pp. 449-486

Andy Brownback, Nathaniel Burke and Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch

Strategic responses to personalized pricing and demand for privacy: An experiment pp. 487-516

Inacio Bo, Li Chen and Rustamdjan Hakimov

Partial credence goods on review platforms pp. 517-534

Ronen Gradwohl and Artyom Jelnov

A recursive measure of voting power that satisfies reasonable postulates pp. 535-565

Arash Abizadeh and Adrian Vetta

Tight incentive analysis of Sybil attacks against the market equilibrium of resource exchange over general networks pp. 566-610

Yukun Cheng, Xiaotie Deng, Yuhao Li and Xiang Yan

Volume 147, issue C, 2024

Asymmetric auctions: Perturbations, ε- equilibrium, and equilibrium pp. 1-18

G.V.A. Dharanan and Alex Ellis

Bicriteria Nash flows over time pp. 19-37

Tim Oosterwijk, Daniel Schmand and Marc Schröder

The existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a discrete ponds dilemma pp. 38-51

Vasily Gusev, Alexander Nesterov, Mikhail Reshetov and Alex Suzdaltsev

Clubs and networks pp. 52-73

Sihua Ding, Marcin Dziubiński and Sanjeev Goyal

Peace in an unequal world? Experimental evidence on the relationship between inequality and conflict in a guns-vs-butter setting pp. 74-87

Alexandra Baier, Sophia Seelos and Thomas Rittmannsberger

Random partitions, potential, value, and externalities pp. 88-106

André Casajus, Yukihiko Funaki and Frank Huettner

Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences pp. 107-127

Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, Oihane Gallo and Marc Vorsatz

Reputation-based persuasion platforms pp. 128-147

Itai Arieli, Omer Madmon and Moshe Tennenholtz

Gender and cooperation in the presence of negative externalities pp. 148-169

Justus Haucap, Christina Heldman and Holger A. Rau

School choice with independent versus consolidated districts pp. 170-205

Thilo Klein, Robert Aue and Josué Ortega

An observability paradox in linked enforcement pp. 206-220

Quan Wen and Bingyong Zheng

Group bargaining: A model of international treaty ratification pp. 221-241

Ravideep Sethi and WonSeok Yoo

Cooperation, norms, and gene-culture coevolution pp. 242-267

Fabian Mankat

Fair division with two-sided preferences pp. 268-287

Ayumi Igarashi, Yasushi Kawase, Warut Suksompong and Hanna Sumita

Revealed preference domains from random choice pp. 288-304

Kremena Valkanova

Can compulsory voting reduce information acquisition? pp. 305-337

Linnéa Marie Rohde

Signaling motives in lying games pp. 338-376

Tilman Fries

Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information pp. 377-387

Itai Arieli and Srinivas Arigapudi

Changing collective action: Nudges and team decisions pp. 388-406

Florian Diekert and Tillmann Eymess

Manipulating the outcome of stable marriage and roommates problems pp. 407-428

Kristóf Bérczi, Gergely Csáji and Tamás Király

To Catch a Stag: Identifying payoff- and risk-dominance effects in coordination games pp. 429-448

Stephan Jagau

Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: Signaling under behavioral diversity pp. 449-459

Junichiro Ishida and Wing Suen

Skewness preferences: Evidence from online poker pp. 460-484

Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt, Johannes Kasinger and Dmitrij Schneider

Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems pp. 485-516

Oihane Gallo and Bettina Klaus

Measuring socially appropriate social preferences pp. 517-532

Jeffrey Carpenter and Andrea Robbett

Stability and substitutability in multi-period matching markets pp. 533-553

Keisuke Bando and Ryo Kawasaki

A note on motivated cognition and discriminatory beliefs pp. 554-562

Lasse S. Stoetzer and Florian Zimmermann