Asymptotic full revelation in cheap talk with many senders

Oleg Rubanov

Games and Economic Behavior, 2025, vol. 150, issue C, 191-196

Abstract: I construct an equilibrium in a cheap talk game with multiple senders that converges to full revelation exponentially fast as the number of senders increases. The senders' biases can be relatively large (comparable to the size of the state space) and have any signs. The equilibrium is robust to replacement noise and exists even if the senders can send only two types of messages.

Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:150:y:2025:i:c:p:191-196

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.005

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