Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 74, issue 2, 2012

The Hotelling–Downs model with runoff voting pp. 447-469

Sandro Brusco, Marcin Dziubiński and Jaideep Roy

Buyer groups as strategic commitments pp. 470-485

James Dana

Multi-unit auctions with budget limits pp. 486-503

Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi and Noam Nisan

Voluntarily separable repeated Prisonerʼs Dilemma with reference letters pp. 504-516

Takako Fujiwara-Greve, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Nobue Suzuki

How common are common priors? pp. 517-525

Ziv Hellman and Dov Samet

All-pay war pp. 526-540

Roland Hodler and Hadi Yektas

Authority and communication in the laboratory pp. 541-560

Ernest K. Lai and Wooyoung Lim

Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities pp. 561-575

Jingfeng Lu

When too little is as good as nothing at all: Rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds pp. 576-587

Vikram Manjunath

On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles pp. 588-600

Ruth Martínez, Jordi Masso, Alejandro Neme and Jorge Oviedo

Learning across games pp. 601-619

Friederike Mengel

Learning to bid: The design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation pp. 620-636

Thomas Noe, Michael Rebello and Jun Wang

Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction pp. 637-650

Ryuji Sano

The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule pp. 651-665

Patrick Schmitz and Thomas Tröger

Optimal auctions with information acquisition pp. 666-686

Xianwen Shi

On the accessibility of core-extensions pp. 687-698

Yi-You Yang

A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints pp. 699-708

Isa Hafalir, R. Ravi and Amin Sayedi

Existence of valuation equilibria when equilibrium strategies cannot differentiate between equal ties pp. 709-713

Philipp Wichardt

Volume 74, issue 1, 2012

Property rights and investments: An evolutionary approach pp. 1-11

Luciano Andreozzi

Behavioral spillovers and cognitive load in multiple games: An experimental study pp. 12-31

Jenna Bednar, Yan Chen, Tracy Liu and Scott Page

Raising juveniles pp. 32-51

Clive Bell, Hans Gersbach and Maik Schneider

Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities pp. 52-67

Olivier Bochet and Sidartha Gordon

The collective action problem: Within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game pp. 68-82

Guillaume Cheikbossian

Dynamic coordination with individual learning pp. 83-101

Amil Dasgupta, Jakub Steiner and Colin Stewart

Signaling without a common prior: Results on experimental equilibrium selection pp. 102-119

Michalis Drouvelis, Wieland Müller and Alex Possajennikov

Minimum cost arborescences pp. 120-143

Bhaskar Dutta and Debasis Mishra

Bargaining with revoking costs pp. 144-153

Rohan Dutta

Nash implementation with partially honest individuals pp. 154-169

Bhaskar Dutta and Arunava Sen

When less is more: Rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests pp. 170-183

Marco Faravelli and Luca Stanca

Iterated regret minimization: A new solution concept pp. 184-207

Joseph Halpern and Rafael Pass

Between-game rule learning in dissimilar symmetric normal-form games pp. 208-221

Ernan Haruvy and Dale Stahl

Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information pp. 222-234

Yuval Heller, Eilon Solan and Tristan Tomala

Stochastic games with information lag pp. 243-256

Yehuda Levy

The fragility of information aggregation in large elections pp. 257-268

Michael Mandler

Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisonerʼs dilemma pp. 269-284

Toshimasa Maruta and Akira Okada

Whom do you distrust and how much does it cost? An experiment on the measurement of trust pp. 285-298

Bill McEvily, Joseph R. Radzevick and Roberto Weber

Transplant quality and patientsʼ preferences in paired kidney exchange pp. 299-310

Antonio Nicolo' and Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez

Equilibrium selection and the dynamic evolution of preferences pp. 311-320

Thomas Norman

On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors pp. 321-331

Daisuke Oyama and Olivier Tercieux

The strategic value of recall pp. 332-351

Ron Peretz

The value of information in a principal–agent model with moral hazard: The ex post contracting case pp. 352-365

Randy Silvers

Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: Experimental evidence pp. 366-381

Matthew Van Essen, Natalia Lazzati and Mark Walker

Robustness against indirect invasions pp. 382-393

Matthijs van Veelen

Group robust stability in matching markets pp. 394-398

Mustafa Afacan

The Herodotus paradox pp. 399-406

Michael Baye, Dan Kovenock and Casper de Vries

Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: The extended Kalai–Smorodinsky solution pp. 407-417

Irem Bozbay, Franz Dietrich and Hans Peters

Ex-post stability of Bayes–Nash equilibria of large games pp. 418-430

Guilherme Carmona and Konrad Podczeck

Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: Sharing the joint gain of cooperation pp. 431-433

Célestin Nembua

Multiple equilibria and limit cycles in evolutionary games with Logit Dynamics pp. 434-441

Cars Hommes and Marius I. Ochea

Agreeing to agree with uncountable information structures pp. 442-446

Siyang Xiong