A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games

Andreas Blume

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 75, issue 2, 510-517

Abstract: This paper shows that the efficiency bound for communication equilibria identified by Goltsman et al. (2009) in the leading example of the Crawford–Sobel model can be obtained with strategy-correlated equilibria, thus preserving privacy vis-à-vis the mediator. More generally, all equilibrium outcomes of the ϵ-noise model of Blume et al. (2007), including outcomes with an uncountable infinity of equilibrium actions, can be obtained via strategy-correlated equilibria of the noise-free game. The occasional mismatch between the encoding and decoding rules used by sender and receiver in a strategy-correlated equilibrium can be interpreted as uncertainty about language use.

Keywords: Communication; Information transmission; Correlation; Language (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:510-517

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.008

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