Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: An experimental study

Marina Agranov, Elizabeth Potamites, Andrew Schotter and Chloe Tergiman

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 75, issue 2, 449-463

Abstract: In this paper we use a laboratory setting to manipulate our subjectsʼ beliefs about the cognitive levels of the players they are playing against. We show that in the context of the 2/3 guessing game, individual choices crucially depend on their beliefs about the level of others. Hence, a subjectʼs true cognitive level may be different than the one he exhibits in a game with the difference being attributed to his expectations about the sophistication of the players he is playing against.

Keywords: Guessing game; Beliefs; Level-k theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (54)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:449-463

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.002

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