Evolution of theories of mind

Erik Mohlin ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 75, issue 1, 299-318

Abstract: This paper studies the evolution of peoplesʼ models of how other people think – their theories of mind. This is formalized within the level-k model, which postulates a hierarchy of types, such that type k plays a k times iterated best response to the uniform distribution. It is found that, under plausible conditions, lower types co-exist with higher types. The results are extended to a model of learning, in which type k plays a k times iterated best response the average of past play. The model is also extended to allow for partial observability of the opponentʼs type.

Keywords: Theory of mind; Depth of reasoning; Evolution; Learning; Level-k; Fictitious play; Cognitive hierarchy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D01 D03 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Working Paper: Evolution of Theories of Mind (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:1:p:299-318

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.009

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