Two-person ex post implementation

Yoshihiro Ohashi

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 75, issue 1, 435-440

Abstract: This paper investigates the ex post implementation of a social choice set with two agents. A social choice set F is ex post implementable with two agents if F satisfies the conditions of ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) and ex post monotonicity (EM) in an environment that is economic and has a bad outcome. Furthermore, if F is a social choice function, (EPIC), (EM), and an economic environment are sufficient.

Keywords: Implementation; Ex post equilibrium; Two-person (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:1:p:435-440

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.006

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