Cooperative strategies in anonymous economies: An experiment

Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari and Maria Bigoni

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 75, issue 2, 570-586

Abstract: We study cooperation in economies of indefinite duration. Participants faced a sequence of prisonerʼs dilemmas with anonymous opponents. We identify and characterize the strategies employed at the individual level. We report that (i) grim trigger does not describe well individual play and there is wide heterogeneity in strategies; (ii) systematic defection does not crowd-out systematic cooperation; (iii) coordination on cooperative strategies does not improve with experience. We discuss alternative methodologies and implications for theory.

Keywords: Folk Theorem; Repeated games; Equilibrium selection; Finite automata; Social dilemma; Random matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C90 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:570-586

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.009

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