Stochastic stability in best shot network games

Leonardo Boncinelli and Paolo Pin

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 75, issue 2, 538-554

Abstract: The best shot game applied to networks is a discrete model of many processes of contribution to local public goods. It generally has a wide multiplicity of equilibria that we refine through stochastic stability. We show that, depending on how we define perturbations – i.e., possible mistakes that agents make – we can obtain very different sets of stochastically stable states. In particular and non-trivially, if we assume that the only possible source of error is that of a contributing agent that stops doing so, then the only stochastically stable states are Nash equilibria with the largest contribution.

Keywords: Networks; Best shot game; Stochastic stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D85 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:538-554

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.001

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