 Rationalizability in games with a continuum of playersGames and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 75, issue 2, 668-684 Abstract: The concept of rationalizability has been used in the last fifteen years to study stability of equilibria in models with a continuum of agents such as competitive markets, macroeconomic dynamics and currency attacks. However, rationalizability has been formally defined in general settings only for games with a finite number of players. We propose an exploration of rationalizability in the context of games with a continuum of players. We deal with a special class of these games, in which payoff of each player depends only on his own strategy and on an aggregate value: the state of the game, which is obtained from the complete action profile. We define the sets of point-rationalizable states and rationalizable states. For the case of continuous payoffs and compact strategy sets, we characterize these sets and prove their convexity and compactness. We provide as well results on the equivalence of point- and standard-rationalizability. Keywords: Rationalizable strategies; Non-atomic games; Expectational coordination; Rational expectations; Eductive stability; Strong rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:668-684 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.004 Access Statistics for this article Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier |
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