Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment

Petra Nieken and Patrick Schmitz

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 75, issue 2, 1000-1008

Abstract: This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on two-period moral hazard problems. The findings corroborate the contract-theoretic insight that even though the periods are technologically unrelated, due to incentive considerations principals can benefit from offering long-term contracts that exhibit memory.

Keywords: Repeated moral hazard; Sequential hidden actions; Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (67)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment (2012)
Working Paper: Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:1000-1008

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.011

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