Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment

Patrick Schmitz and Petra Nieken

No 8241, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on two-period moral hazard problems. The findings corroborate the contract-theoretic insight that even though the periods are technologically unrelated, due to incentive considerations principals may prefer to offer contracts with memory.

Keywords: Laboratory experiment; Repeated moral hazard; Sequential hidden actions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cta, nep-exp and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP8241 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Journal Article: Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment (2012)
Working Paper: Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8241

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP8241

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().