A new stable and more responsive cost sharing solution for minimum cost spanning tree problems

Christian Trudeau

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 75, issue 1, 402-412

Abstract: Minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) problems try to connect agents efficiently to a source when agents are located at different points in space and the cost of using an edge is fixed. We introduce a new cost sharing solution that always selects a point in the core and that is more responsive to changes than the well-studied folk solution. The paper shows a sufficient condition for the concavity of the stand-alone cost game. Modifying the game to make sure the condition is satisfied and then taking the Shapley value gives the new solution.

Keywords: Minimum cost spanning tree; Private property; Common property; Core; Folk solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D70 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (51)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825611001497
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:1:p:402-412

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.002

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().