Candidate quality in a Downsian model with a continuous policy space

Enriqueta Aragones and Dimitrios Xefteris

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 75, issue 2, 464-480

Abstract: This paper characterizes a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections with a continuous policy space, where candidates are office motivated and one candidate enjoys a non-policy advantage over the other candidate. We show that if votersʼ utility functions are concave and the median voter ideal point is drawn from a unimodal distribution, there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where the advantaged candidate chooses the ideal point of the expected median voter with probability one and the disadvantaged candidate uses a mixed strategy that is symmetric around it. Existence conditions require the variance of the distribution to be small enough relative to the size of the advantage.

Keywords: Spatial competition; Mixed strategies; Candidate quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 H1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Candidate quality in a Downsian Model with a Continuous Policy Space (2011)
Working Paper: Candidate quality in a Downsian Model with a Continuous Policy Space
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:464-480

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.008

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