A dynamic Ellsberg urn experiment

Adam Dominiak, Peter Duersch and Jean-Philippe Lefort
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Peter Dürsch

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 75, issue 2, 625-638

Abstract: Many theories of updating under ambiguity assume either dynamic consistency or consequentialism to underpin behaviorally the link between conditional and unconditional preferences. To test the descriptive validity of these rationality concepts, we conduct a dynamic extension of Ellsbergʼs 3-color experiment. We find that more subjects act in line with consequentialism than with dynamic consistency and that this result is even stronger among ambiguity averse subjects.

Keywords: Non-expected utility preferences; Ambiguity; Updating; Dynamic consistency; Consequentialism; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (51)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089982561200005X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: A Dynamic Ellsberg Urn Experiment (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:625-638

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.01.002

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().