Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Prices in Mixed Cost Allocation Problems pp. 243-258: Emilio Calvo Ramón and Juan Carlos Santos
A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries pp. 259-294: John Duggan and Cesar Martinelli
Monotone Games with Positive Spillovers pp. 295-320: Douglas Gale
Alternative Semantics for Unawareness pp. 321-339: Joseph Halpern
A Behavioral Learning Process in Games pp. 340-366: Jean-François Laslier, Richard Topol and Bernard Walliser
Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem pp. 367-387: Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme
Player Types and Self-Impression Management in Dictatorship Games: Two Experiments pp. 388-414: John Murnighan, John M. Oesch and Madan Pillutla
Game Theory via Revealed Preferences pp. 415-424: Indrajit Ray and Lin Zhou
Substantive Rationality and Backward Induction pp. 425-435: Joseph Halpern
Coalition Formation and Potential Games pp. 436-448: Marco Slikker

Adaptive Learning versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining pp. 1-25: Klaus Abbink, Gary Bolton, Abdolkarim Sadrieh and Fang-Fang Tang
Large Nonanonymous Repeated Games pp. 26-39: Nabil I. Al-Najjar and Rann Smorodinsky
Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution pp. 40-78: Salvador Barberà, M. Maschler and Jonathan Shalev
Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest pp. 79-120: Andreas Blume, Douglas V. DeJong, Yong-Gwan Kim and Geoffrey B. Sprinkle
On Money Pumps pp. 121-160: Robin Cubitt and Robert Sugden
The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games pp. 161-169: Werner Guth, Steffen Huck and Wieland Müller
Perfect Equilibria in a Model of Bargaining with Arbitration pp. 170-195: Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti
Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism pp. 196-215: Joel Sobel
Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma pp. 216-242: Thomas Wiseman and Okan Yilankaya

Cycles of Aggregate Behavior in Theory and Experiment pp. 105-137: Antoni Bosch-Domènech and Maria Saez-Marti
Reference Points and Negative Reciprocity in Simple Sequential Games pp. 138-157: Jordi Brandts and Carles Sola
Debates and Decisions: On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules pp. 158-173: Jacob Glazer and Ariel Rubinstein
Average Monotonic Cooperative Games pp. 174-192: Josep M. Izquierdo and Carles Rafels
Epsilon Cores of Games with Limited Side Payments: Nonemptiness and Equal Treatment pp. 193-218: Alexander Kovalenkov and Myrna Wooders
Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction pp. 219-240: Giuseppe (Pino) Lopomo
Some Surprising Properties of Power Indices pp. 241-263: Donald G. Saari and Katri K. Sieberg
Cooperation in an Overlapping Generations Experiment pp. 264-275: Theo Offerman, Jan Potters and Harrie A. A. Verbon

In Memoriam: John C. Harsanyi 1920-2000 pp. 1-1: Ehud Kalai
Eulogy to My Father: John C. Harsanyi, 1920-2000 pp. 2-4: Tom Harsanyi
In Memoriam: John C. Harsanyi pp. 5-6: Kenneth Arrow
Harsanyi's Sweater pp. 7-8: Robert Aumann
Creativity and Acclaim pp. 9-10: Ken Binmore
Sociological Thinking pp. 11-11: Laszlo Cseh-Szombathy
Homage from a Student pp. 12-12: Mary Macgregor
My Encounters with John Harsanyi pp. 13-14: Michael Maschler
Achievement Against Odds pp. 15-18: C. Bart McGuire
Harsanyi's Intellectual Legacy pp. 19-19: Simona Morini
Learning Game Theory from John Harsanyi pp. 20-25: Roger Myerson
A Friend and Colleague pp. 26-27: Nelson N. Polsby
A Personal Tribute to John Harsanyi pp. 28-29: Paul Samuelson
A Letter to the Editor pp. 30-30: Tibor Scitovsky
John C. Harsanyi, System Builder and Conceptual Innovator pp. 31-46: Reinhard Selten
Postscript pp. 47-50: Reinhard Selten
Branching Time, Perfect Information Games, and Backward Induction pp. 57-73: Giacomo Bonanno
Sequential Auctions of Endogenously Valued Objects pp. 74-103: Ian L. Gale and Mark Stegeman

Economics and Artificial Intelligence pp. 1-5: Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz and Hal Varian
Coordinated Action in the Electronic Mail Game pp. 6-30: Ken Binmore and Larry Samuelson
Probability Logic for Type Spaces pp. 31-53: Aviad Heifetz and Philippe Mongin
Expected Qualitative Utility Maximization pp. 54-79: Daniel Lehmann
Learning in Network Contexts: Experimental Results from Simulations pp. 80-123: Amy Greenwald, Eric J. Friedman and Scott Shenker
Multiagent Cooperative Search for Portfolio Selection pp. 124-165: David C. Parkes and Bernardo A. Huberman
Algorithmic Mechanism Design pp. 166-196: Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen
On Rational Computability and Communication Complexity pp. 197-211: Yoav Shoham and Moshe Tennenholtz
Leveled Commitment Contracts and Strategic Breach pp. 212-270: Tuomas W. Sandholm and Victor R. Lesser
Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling pp. 271-303: Michael Wellman, William E. Walsh, Peter R. Wurman and Jeffrey Mackie-Mason
A Parametrization of the Auction Design Space pp. 304-338: Peter R. Wurman, Michael Wellman and William E. Walsh
Equilibria in Automated Interactions pp. 339-348: Nir Vulkan