Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

It takes two to tango: Equilibria in a model of sales pp. 493-510: Michael Baye, Dan Kovenock and Casper de Vries
Conventions, social prejudices and discrimination: A festival game with merrymakers pp. 511-527: Mamoru Kaneko and Toshiyuki Kimura
The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form pp. 528-552: Daphne Koller and Nimrod Megiddo
The small worlds axiom for stable equilibria pp. 553-564: Jean-François Mertens
Coalition-proof nash equilibria and the core in three-player games pp. 565-581: Benny Moldovanu
The multilinear extension and the coalition structure value pp. 582-587: Guillermo Owen and Eyal Winter
The least core, nucleolus, and kernel of homogeneous weighted majority games pp. 588-605: Bezalel Peleg and Joachim Rosenmuller
Credible assignments in coordination games pp. 606-626: John van Huyck, Ann B. Gillette and Raymond Battalio
Optimal pricing against a simple learning rule pp. 627-649: Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden

Simultaneous signaling through investment in an R& D game with private information pp. 327-346: Reiko Aoki and David Reitman
A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information pp. 347-372: Jeffrey Banks and Randall L. Calvert
Welfare bounds in the cooperative production problem pp. 373-401: Herve Moulin
Coalition formation under limited communication pp. 402-421: Edward C. Rosenthal
Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes pp. 422-425: Daniel Seidmann
Folk theorems in overlapping generations games pp. 426-449: Lones Smith
On self-enforcement in extensive-form games pp. 450-462: Jörgen Weibull
Continuous implementation in economics with incomplete information pp. 463-483: David Wettstein
On nash implementation of social choice correspondences pp. 484-492: Takehiko Yamato

A unique solution to n-person sequential bargaining pp. 169-181: Geir Asheim
Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures pp. 182-201: Adam Brandenburger, Eddie Dekel and John Geanakoplos
The exponential convergence of Bayesian learning in normal form games pp. 202-217: James Jordan
Equilibrium refinement in psychological games pp. 218-231: Van Kolpin
Short-rune stable matchings between bees and flowers pp. 232-251: Bezalel Peleg and A. Shmida
Self-optimality and efficiency in utility distortion games pp. 252-260: Hans Peters
Mixed strategies in strictly competitive games: A further test of the minimax hypothesis pp. 261-283: Amnon Rapoport and Richard B. Boebel
Dominated strategies and common knowledge pp. 284-313: Larry Samuelson
Game theory: By Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991. 608 pp., $35.00 pp. 314-317: Charles A. Wilson

On being honest and behaving honestly pp. 1-17: Moshe Adler
Imperfect equilibrium pp. 18-36: Avraham Beja
Risk sharing with competition pp. 37-57: Gary Biglaiser
Strategic claim games corresponding to an NTU-game pp. 58-71: Peter Borm and S. H. Tijs
Coalitions, leadership, and social norms: The power of suggestion in games pp. 72-100: Peter DeMarzo
The good, the bad, and the ugly: Coalition proof equilibrium in infinite games pp. 101-121: Charles Kahn and Dilip Mookherjee
On platers with a bounded number of states pp. 122-131: Christos H. Papadimitriou
The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition structure pp. 132-144: Eyal Winter
The hybrid solutions of an N-person game pp. 145-160: Jingang Zhao
Two-sided matching: A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis: By Alvin E. Roth and Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor, Econometric Society Monographs, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990. 265 + xiii pp., $54.50 (hardback) pp. 161-165: Uriel G. Rothblum

Uniqueness of equilibrium for smooth multistage concave games pp. 393-402: Murray Brown, Shin-Hwan Chiang and Kenji Yamamoto
Constrained egalitarian allocations pp. 403-422: Bhaskar Dutta and Debraj Ray
Delayed agreements and nonexpected utility pp. 423-437: Chaim Fershtman, Zvi Safra and Daniel Vincent
Discriminatory von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions pp. 438-452: Johannes G. C. Heijmans
Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers pp. 453-466: Ebbs Hendon and Torben Tranaes
Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders pp. 467-486: George Mailath and Peter Zemsky
The core of an m-sided assignment game pp. 487-503: Thomas Quint

Maxmin and minmax for coalitional game forms pp. 267-277: Joseph Abdou
Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games pp. 278-294: Geir Asheim
Do people exploit their bargaining power? An experimental study pp. 295-322: Ken Binmore, Peter Morgan, Avner Snaked and John Sutton
Competitively cost advantageous mergers and monopolization pp. 323-338: Morton I. Kamien and Israel Zang
Stable payoffs in resale-proof trades of information pp. 339-349: Mikio Nakayama and Luis Quintas
The positive value of information pp. 350-355: Abraham Neyman
Pure-strategy [epsiv]-Nash equilibrium in two-person non-zero-sum games pp. 356-367: Tadeusz Radzik
The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor pp. 368-384: Dale Stahl
Axiomatic theory of bargaining with a variable number of agents: By W. Thomson and T. Lensberg, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989. 230 pp., $39.50 pp. 385-387: Herve Moulin
Game theory: Analysis of conflict: By Roger B. Myerson, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991. 568 pp., $45.00 pp. 387-391: Ehud Kalai

A note on equalization in extensive form games pp. 157-162: Gustavo Bergantino and Ignacio Garcia-Jurado
The Pareto set of the partition bargaining problem pp. 163-182: Daniel Granot and Uriel G. Rothblum
Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information pp. 183-220: Thomas Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal
Forward induction and sunk costs give average cost pricing pp. 221-236: Jean-Pierre Ponssard
A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commitment opportunities pp. 237-243: Robert Rosenthal
A repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players pp. 244-259: David Salant
Bargaining and markets: By Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, Academic Press, San Diego, 1990. ISBN 0-12-528631-7, xi + 216 pp., $14.95 Paper, $34.50 hardbound pp. 260-264: Ken Binmore

Evolution, learning, and economic behavior pp. 3-24: Reinhard Selten
An "evolutionary" interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination pp. 25-59: Vincent Crawford
Bayesian learning in normal form games pp. 60-81: James Jordan
Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games pp. 82-100: Paul Milgrom and John Roberts
Viscous population equilibria pp. 101-109: Roger Myerson, Gregory B. Pollock and Jeroen Swinkels
Limit evolutionarily stable strategies in two-player, normal form games pp. 110-128: Larry Samuelson
Prestable strategies in discounted duopoly games pp. 129-144: William Stanford
Cooperation in the long-run pp. 145-156: H. Young and Dean Foster