Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 66, issue 2, 2009

In memoriam: David Gale (1921-2008) pp. 581-581

Joel Sobel and Bernhard von Stengel

The Berkeley Memorial pp. 582-593

Alan Weinstein, Harold Kuhn, Leo A. Goodman, Daniel McFadden, Joel Sobel, Ilan Adler, Jacob Feldman, Ahmet Alkan, Katharine Gale, Elizabeth Dunning, Samara Watkiss, Roger Gilbert, Jonathan Birt, Graham Ingham and Sandra M. Gilbert

David Gale in Paris pp. 594-597

Michel Balinski, Rida Laraki and Sylvain Sorin

The Galetron pp. 598-598

Elwyn Berlekamp

More Gale Tales pp. 599-599

William Brock

Sex and the mathematician: The High School Prom Theorem pp. 600-600

Martin Davis

David in Paris pp. 601-602

Gabrielle Demange

Two lemmas that changed general equilibrium theory pp. 603-605

Monique Florenzano

My memories of David Gale pp. 606-606

Richard Karp

Equilibrium and optimality: Some imprints of David Gale pp. 607-626

Mukul Majumdar

Gale at Princeton pp. 627-627

John Nash

Remembering David Gale pp. 628-629

Robert Osserman

My introduction to top-trading cycles pp. 630-631

Herbert Scarf

ReGale: Some memorable results pp. 632-642

Joel Sobel

My encounters with David Gale pp. 643-646

Marilda Sotomayor

Topological games at Princeton, a mathematical memoir pp. 647-656

David Gale

Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market pp. 660-684

Moshe Babaioff, Noam Nisan and Elan Pavlov

On the benefits of party competition pp. 685-707

Dan Bernhardt, Larissa Campuzano, Francesco Squintani and Odilon Câmara

Commitment and observability in a contracting environment pp. 708-720

V Bhaskar

Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations pp. 721-728

Francis Bloch and Bhaskar Dutta

All equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction pp. 729-741

Andreas Blume, Paul Heidhues, Jonathan Lafky, Johannes Münster and Meixia Zhang

The aggregate-monotonic core pp. 742-748

Pedro Calleja, Carles Rafels and Stef Tijs

Existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection pp. 749-760

Guilherme Carmona and José Fajardo

Endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints pp. 761-774

John Conley and William Neilson

Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games pp. 775-784

Francesco De Sinopoli and Carlos Pimienta

Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction pp. 785-812

John Duffy and Jack Ochs

Equilibrium vengeance pp. 813-829

Daniel Friedman and Nirvikar Singh

When curiosity kills the profits: An experimental examination pp. 830-840

Julian Jamison and Dean Karlan

Repeated signaling games pp. 841-854

Ayça Kaya

Auctions in which losers set the price pp. 855-864

Claudio Mezzetti and Ilia Tsetlin

Rapid evolution under inertia pp. 865-879

Thomas Norman

A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions pp. 880-892

Selcuk Ozyurt and Remzi Sanver

Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets pp. 893-919

Pierre Picard

Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games pp. 920-927

Carlos Pimienta

Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information pp. 928-949

Carolyn Pitchik

A general structure theorem for the Nash equilibrium correspondence pp. 950-958

Arkadi Predtetchinski

Strategic complementarities and search market equilibrium pp. 959-978

Michael Rauh

Informational externalities and emergence of consensus pp. 979-994

Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille

Approachability with bounded memory pp. 995-1004

Ehud Lehrer and Eilon Solan

Volume 66, issue 1, 2009

Price and capacity competition pp. 1-26

Daron Acemoglu, Kostas Bimpikis and Asuman Ozdaglar

Non-hyperbolic time inconsistency pp. 27-38

Han Bleichrodt, Kirsten Rohde and Peter Wakker

Communication networks with endogenous link strength pp. 39-56

Francis Bloch and Bhaskar Dutta

Disputed lands pp. 57-77

Marco Dall'Aglio and Fabio Maccheroni

Bargaining over bets pp. 78-97

Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler

Random matching in adaptive dynamics pp. 98-114

Glenn Ellison, Drew Fudenberg and Lorens A. Imhof

Efficient graph topologies in network routing games pp. 115-125

Amir Epstein, Michal Feldman and Yishay Mansour

Repeated games with voluntary information purchase pp. 126-145

János Flesch and Andrés Perea

The beauty of "bigness": On optimal design of multi-winner contests pp. 146-161

Qiang Fu and Jingfeng Lu

Tournaments with midterm reviews pp. 162-190

Alex Gershkov and Motty Perry

Deterministic approximation of best-response dynamics for the Matching Pennies game pp. 191-201

Ziv Gorodeisky

Cooperation in viscous populations--Experimental evidence pp. 202-220

Veronika Grimm and Friederike Mengel

Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents pp. 221-237

John Kagel and Dan Levin

Equilibrium refinement vs. level-k analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information pp. 238-255

Toshiji Kawagoe and Hirokazu Takizawa

Multi-battle contests pp. 256-274

Kai Konrad and Dan Kovenock

Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting? pp. 275-291

Stefan Krasa and Mattias K Polborn

Switching costs in infinitely repeated games pp. 292-314

Barton Lipman and Ruqu Wang

Approachability in repeated games: Computational aspects and a Stackelberg variant pp. 315-325

Shie Mannor and John N. Tsitsiklis

Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions pp. 326-347

Debasis Mishra and David C. Parkes

Network architecture and traffic flows: Experiments on the Pigou-Knight-Downs and Braess Paradoxes pp. 348-372

John Morgan, Henrik Orzen and Martin Sefton

Oligopoly limit-pricing in the lab pp. 373-393

Wieland Müller, Yossi Spiegel and Yaron Yehezkel

A theory of kindness, reluctance, and shame for social preferences pp. 394-403

William Neilson

Growth of strategy sets, entropy, and nonstationary bounded recall pp. 404-425

Abraham Neyman and Daijiro Okada

The game motoneurons play pp. 426-461

Irit Nowik

Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games pp. 462-487

Frank Page and Myrna Wooders

Commitment games pp. 488-505

Ludovic Renou

Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments--An experimental study pp. 506-525

Matthias Sutter and Christina Strassmair

Implementation in economies with non-convex production technologies unknown to the designer pp. 526-545

Guoqiang Tian

Random assignment under weak preferences pp. 546-558

Özgür Yılmaz

Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities pp. 559-565

László Kóczy

Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability pp. 566-575

Matteo Triossi