Games played in a contracting environment

V Bhaskar

Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, vol. 67, issue 2, 389-398

Abstract: We analyze normal form games where a player has to pay a price to a supplier in order to play a specific action. Our focus is on supplier competition, arising from the fact that distinct suppliers supply different players, and possibly different actions of the same player. With private contracts, where a player only observes the prices quoted by his own suppliers, the set of equilibrium distributions over player actions coincides with the set of equilibrium distributions when all actions are supplied competitively, at cost. With public contracts, the two distributions differ dramatically even in simple games.

Keywords: Multi-party; contracting; Marginal; contributions; Perfect; substitutes; Perfect; complements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Games Played in a Contracting Environment (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:67:y:2009:i:2:p:389-398

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